What (if anything) is Wrong With Human Enhancement? What (if anything) is Right with It? by Cohen, I. Glenn
 
What (if anything) is Wrong With Human Enhancement? What (if
anything) is Right with It?
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation I. Glenn Cohen, What (if anything) is Wrong With Human
Enhancement? What (if anything) is Right with It?, 49 Tulsa L.
Rev. 645 (2013).
Published Version http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss3/4/
Accessed February 16, 2015 2:50:02 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12956301
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAPTulsa Law Review
Volume 49
Issue 3Health Law Policy - Honoring the Work of
Einer Elhauge
Article 4
Spring 2014
What (if anything) is Wrong With Human
Enhancement? What (if anything) is Right with It?
I. Glenn Cohen
Follow this and additional works at:http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of theLaw Commons
This Legal Scholarship Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Tulsa Law Review by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contactdaniel-bell@utulsa.edu.
Recommended Citation
I. G. Cohen,What (if anything) is Wrong With Human Enhancement? What (if anything) is Right with It?, 49 Tulsa L. Rev. 645 (2014).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss3/4	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
645 
WHAT (IF ANYTHING) IS WRONG  
WITH HUMAN ENHANCEMENT?  
WHAT (IF ANYTHING) IS RIGHT WITH IT? 
I. Glenn Cohen * 
It is both a pleasure and honor to participate in this festschrift for Einer Elhauge, 
who has been a wonderful mentor, colleague, and friend to me and many others. Einer 
has the kind of mind and career we all aspire to, having been a preeminent voice in no 
less  than  four  fields—antitrust,  contracts,  statutory  interpretation,  and  health 
law/bioethics. It is this last area of his on which I will write. This article will focus on the 
question of human enhancement. Einer has an unpublished book in progress on the sub-
ject, Re-Engineering Humans—What Limits?, which has influenced my own thinking on 
this topic, as have our numerous conversations on the issue. With advances in reproduc-
tive technologies, genetic screenings, and concomitant calls for regulation of these things 
in America the time for discussing these issues has never been better. 
This article proceeds as follows: Part I offers a reconstructive taxonomy as to dif-
ferent kinds of enhancements, including incorporating one distinction (as to absolute and 
positional goods and positive and negative externalities) that has been the focus of El-
hauge’s own writing.  That said, one leitmotif of this Part is that “enhancement” as a cat-
egory may not be particularly useful, especially if we accept there are not morally rele-
vant  differences  in  the  biological  vs.  non-biological  and  treatment  vs.  enhancement 
distinctions, such that something like tutoring falls into the category of “enhancement.” 
Part II offers a taxonomy of legal/regulatory interventions. Part III attempts to sketch and 
interrogate the major arguments offered against human enhancement, including by map-
ping these arguments onto the taxonomies developed in Parts I and II and showing to 
which kinds of enhancements they apply and what kinds of legal/regulatory interventions 
can accommodate some of the concerns they raise. Finally, Part IV focuses on a question 
that has received surprisingly scant attention: why enhancement is sought. I will argue 
that one key reason offered for enhancement, to improve the life of the enhanced in the 
case of enhancement through reproduction, cannot be sustained for reasons that mirror 
points I have made elsewhere on the opposite issue, the justification for preventing par-
ents from reproducing in ways that “harm” their offspring.1 
                                                 
  *  Professor, Harvard Law School, and Co-Director, Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotech-
nology, and Bioethics. I thank Dov Fox, Einer Elhauge, Matt Lamkin, Chris Robertson, Jeff Skopek, attendees 
of the bricks-and-mortar symposium in Tulsa honoring Professor Elhauge and participants in the Health Law 
Policy, Bioethics, and Biotechnology Workshop at Harvard Law School for helpful comments, as well as par-
ticipants at the University of San Diego faculty colloquium. Taj Moore provided excellent research assistance. 
  1.     I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1187 (2012) [hereinafter Cohen, Beyond Best 
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I. A TAXONOMY OF ENHANCEMENT 
To begin with, I think it useful to map out what form enhancement might take and 
some key distinctions that may be relevant as we think about what, if anything, the law 
should say about enhancement. 
a. Biological vs. Non-Biological Enhancement: 
When  people  speak  about  enhancement,  many  people  think  of  biological  en-
hancement. But it is unclear whether there is anything distinctive, from a moral or legal 
point of view, between biological enhancements and non-biological enhancements. A 
good example of a non-biological enhancement discussed in the literature is all forms of 
learning or training, such as LSAT tutoring for prospective law school applicants.2 While 
this is a line traditionally offered in the literature on enhancement, one might wonder 
whether learning really is,  deep  down,  actually  a  biological  enhancement—when we 
learn our brains change, there is no other way to learn except the alteration of our biolo-
gy. One can parse the matter by suggesting that what we really mean by “biological en-
hancement” is “enhancement that directly alters our biology rather than alters that biolo-
gy indirectly,” but as we seek to alter the language to be more precise the attractiveness 
of this as a moral or legal line to draw becomes, at least to me, increasingly suspect. 
In any event, let us imagine, dubitante, that this line can really be drawn. Within 
the non-biological category, some non-biological enhancements will take the form of 
“add-ons” rather than alterations. For example, the new Google Glass might be thought 
of as a kind of enhancement that allows the user to see things and access information that 
he might not already have access to. At some point, the line between a non-biological 
enhancement versus an adjunct technology will be blurred. I do not think there is a single 
right answer as to where to draw that line; instead such line-drawing heavily depends on 
the particular moral concern motivating the inquiry. For instance, if the issue is inequita-
ble access, then adjuncts—to nerd-out for a bit, the visor worn by Lt. Geordi La Forge in 
Star Trek: The Next Generation that allows him to see more of the E-M Spectrum—and 
true enhancements—the artificial eyes Geordi wears in the Star Trek Films that let him 
do the same—seem indistinguishable. By contrast, if the objection relates to the perfec-
tion of the human body and theological or non-theological objections to mucking around 
with it, the distinction might prove important with adjunct technologies posing less of a 
concern. 
One interesting implication of these distinctions is that the regulatory regime that 
                                                                                                                       
Interests]; I. Glenn Cohen, Burying Best Interests of the Resulting Child: A Response to Professors Crawford, 
Alvaré, and Mutcherson, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2012); I. Glenn Cohen, Rethinking Sperm Donor Anonymity: Of 
Changed Selves, Non-Identity, and One Night Stands, 100 GEO. L.J. 431 (2012) [hereinafter Cohen, Rethinking 
Sperm Donor Anonymity]; I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 
MINN. L. REV. 423 (2011) [hereinafter Cohen, Regulating Reproduction]; I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Dimin-
ishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, In-
tentional Diminishment]. 
  2.   To  his  credit,  Elhauge  in  his  work  puts  pressure  on  the  question  of  whether  biological  and  non-
biological enhancements are different. For another prominent writer in the field with very different views on 
enhancement from Elhauge and I, who also aims to show that biological and non-biological enhancement raise 
similar issues, see generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE AGE OF 
GENETIC ENGINEERING (2007). 
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currently exists focuses quite a lot on biological enhancement and almost not at all on 
non-biological enhancements. Google Glass, and many other possible technological en-
hancements, falls flatly outside of the regulation of FDA or any other agency that would 
give serious thought to its enhancement capabilities. By contrast, attempts to alter our 
brains or our bodies at the biological level are regulated by FDA rules about drugs and 
devices, rules about the use of stem cells in certain states or countries or some institu-
tions, and the tort system on the back end through medical malpractice. Drawing the line 
this way might make a lot of sense if we thought that biological enhancements were par-
ticularly dangerous, raised particularly difficult ethical practices, etc. Perhaps there is 
something about the invasiveness of drugs and implantable devices, or their nature as 
credence goods that might lead us to believe this is (in general true) on the safety side. 
On the ethics side, though, it seems to me that Google Glass and its like is just as likely 
to have profound effects on our society raising difficult ethical questions (relating to sur-
veillance, what it means to constantly be networked)3 than, for example, the use of Hu-
man Growth Hormone. To the extent the category of biological enhancements stirs up 
more worry for us in terms of pre-theoretical intuitions on the subject, I suspect that this 
is because of features that some pertinent kinds of biological enhancements share and 
many non-biological ones (again assuming such a line is tenable) do not, such that what 
is ethically significant is not that an enhancement is biological but that it shares one of 
these more atomistic features, of the kind discussed below. 
 
Within the category of biological enhancements, we can usefully distinguish: 
i. Genetic enhancements vs. non-genetic biological enhancements 
In the second category would be getting breast augmentation or reduction, using 
Ritalin or another ADHD medication for help on the SATs, using beta-blockers before 
an Olympic pistol shooting competition, and, in a memorable scene in the science fiction 
film Gattaca, lengthening Vincent’s legs by breaking the bones and stretching them.4 As 
I will discuss below, altering our genome directly is still primarily hypothetical, but pro-
ducing certain genes through selection is already commonly done. Why should genetic 
enhancements be singled out? I am not sure they should, but one possibility is that they 
are thought of as more “fundamentally us” in some way; another possibility is that they 
may be passed on to future generations (but only if germ-line alterations are done); final-
ly, it is possible that the genetic vs. non-genetic question is actually serving as an inexact 
proxy for the reversibility question discussed below, though genetic alterations will not 
exhaust the universe of irreversible changes and there may be genetic changes that are 
reversible. 
                                                 
  3.   I.  Glenn  Cohen,  The  Ethicist’s  and  the  Lawyer’s  New  Clothes  (Feb.  11,  2014), 
https://www.radcliffe.harvard.edu/event/2014-i-glenn-cohen-lecture. 
  4.   GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997). I am indebted to Elhauge for the pistol shooting example, which 
relates to Kim Jong Su, the second best pistol shooter in the 2008 Olympics, who was stripped of his bronze 
medal when he was shown to have used a beta-blocker to try and improve his performance. Matt Scott, Olym-
pics:  Korean  Double  Medalist  Expelled  for  Drug  Use,  GUARDIAN  (Aug.  15,  2008), 
http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2008/aug/15/olympics2008.drugsinsport;  2  Olympians  Fail  Drug  Test  at 
Beijing  Games,  NBC  NEWS  (Aug.  15,  2008),  http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26211139/ns/beijing_olympics-
beijing_olympics_news/t/olympians-fail-doping-test-beijing-games/#.UjyHDGSc4RY. 
3
Cohen: What (if anything) is Wrong With Human Enhancement? What (if anyt
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
648  TULSA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 49:645 
 
A separate set of distinctions has to do with whom is doing the enhancing and 
when. 
b. Choosing for Ourselves vs. Choosing for Others Who Cannot Choose for Themselves:5 
One could choose to enhance oneself, for example choosing to take anabolic ster-
oids or to get cosmetic surgery. One could also choose to enhance others who cannot 
make a choice for themselves. Children are the most important members of this latter 
category. Here we should draw a further distinction when it comes to choosing for oth-
ers: 
i. Enhancing after birth vs. enhancing before birth 
As will become more clear in later Parts of this article, it may matter for ethical 
analysis whether enhancement takes place after versus before birth. An example of en-
hancement of one’s child after birth would be providing him or her with Human Growth 
Hormone to help him or her grow taller. Among pre-birth interventions we should draw 
still another distinction: 
 
1. Enhancing by selection vs. enhancing by manipulation of already fertilized 
embryos or implanted fetuses 
In enhancing by selection, one tries to influence the traits one’s child will exhibit 
(i.e., its phenotype) by making decisions about the child’s genotype. One good example 
of this is the “shopping” done for potential sperm donors by single or lesbian women 
seeking to reproduce and by egg brokers catering to other uses of reproductive technolo-
gies. Sperm banks frequently offer catalogues selling certain features that prospective 
“customers” will find desirable, such as intelligence and height, as might egg brokers.6 A 
different kind of selection would be in choosing for implantation between numerous pre-
embryos that prospective parents have already fertilized as part of In Vitro Fertilization.7 
Both of these are to be contrasted with post-conception but pre-birth manipulation. 
Though mostly hypothetical at the moment, this could take the form of genetic exploita-
tion of an already fertilized embryo and/or surgical interventions on already implanted 
                                                 
  5.   Hypothetically we could imagine imposing enhancements on adults who object, for example, to “hack-
ing the brain” of criminals to increase their impulse control or moral judgment. This is not commonly discussed 
in the literature and, even more so than the other possibilities, is truly science fictional, so I will put it to one 
side. The closest analogue I can think of that is sometimes discussed is involuntary drug regimens imposed on 
carriers of certain forms of Tuberculosis B. See Josephine Gittler, Controlling Resurgent Tuberculosis: Public 
Health Agencies, Public Policy, and Law, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 107, 139 (claiming that “compulsory 
TB control laws” could be crafted to respect federal statutory and constitutional requirements, making clear 
that the voluntary public health response to HIV cannot work to combat TB); Lawrence Gostin, Tuberculosis 
and the Power of the State: Toward the Development of Rational Standards for the Review of Compulsory Pub-
lic Health Powers, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 219, 222 (1995) (referring to nineteenth-century compulso-
ry measures taken to combat tuberculosis). 
  6.   See, e.g., Rene Almeling, Gender and the Value of Bodily Goods: Commodification in Egg and Sperm 
Donation, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 48-56 (2009); Martha Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood 
Market? A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 27-31 (2003).  
  7.   See, e.g., Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, supra note 1, at 347. 
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fetuses in order to achieve desired traits or avoid undesired ones.8 
c. Enhancements Compatible with Expanding Life Plans vs. Enhancements That Will 
Limit Options 
Some enhancements are “swiss army knives” in that they can improve the pro-
spects for a child, whatever the child chooses to do with his life. Improvements in intelli-
gence and disease resistance fit comfortably here. By contrast, other enhancements will 
serve to close off certain life plans while they improve the chances in others. An en-
hancement in height may improve the chance that a child will play in the NBA, but de-
crease the chance that they will be able to serve on a submarine. The same is true regard-
ing non-biological enhancements. Helping a child improve the skill level at which he or 
she reads by making her practice is an enhancement that is compatible with many life 
plans in our society. By contrast, making a child practice piano for five hours a day will 
foreclose developments of other skills (sports, social, etc.) and may limit options in the 
future. 
Again, this is best thought of as a continuum, with a sense of how many options 
are being foreclosed for the sake of a particular enhancement. 
Another set of distinctions relates to how much enhancement is taking place and of 
what kind: 
d. Reversible vs. Irreversible Enhancement: 
This distinction is actually more of a continuum. On the one extreme, genetic en-
hancement through selection generates what we would think of as an irreversible en-
hancement. If one’s genes are made better by the choices of genetic material to be used 
in reproduction by one’s parent(s), that genotype is set and cannot be altered in the fu-
ture, at least given our current technology. On the other extreme, there are enhancements 
that are easily undone. For example, an adjunct like an artificial limb that could be re-
moved and re-attached at will. In between are alterations that might be undone at signifi-
cant costs or perhaps “re-done.” A patient who gets a rhinoplasty (aka “nose job”) and is 
dissatisfied with his new nose could, in theory, get the doctor to try to reconstruct the old 
nose, but it is unclear whether it would be exactly the same as the prior version. 
Notice the way this interfaces differently with self-enhancement versus enhancing 
one’s children. In self-enhancement, irreversible enhancements raise concerns that are 
paternalistic, that one will make poor decisions one will later come to regret and cannot 
undo. By contrast, in enhancing others’ irreversibility means that the choices made for 
children are ones that those children cannot undo. In this way it bears a family resem-
blance to other kinds of body alteration of children, such as male circumcision or female 
genital cutting, to which some object that it should be the child’s choice to alter their 
body in this way that cannot be undone. 
A further distinction has to do with how enhancement relates to particular base-
                                                 
  8.   See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Shaping Future Children: Parental Rights and Societal Interests, 13 J. POL. 
PHIL. 377, 395-96 (2005); Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, supra note 1, at 347-48; Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, 
Creating  Children  with  Disabilities:  Parental  Tort  Liability  for  Preimplantation  Genetic  Interventions,  60 
HASTINGS L.J. 299, 332-34 (2008). 
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lines. 
e. Enhancement vs. Treatment (?): 
Some would draw distinctions between “treatment” to correct disease or disability 
as opposed to enhancement to make people “better than well.” Some defend this as an 
important distinction. For example, Norman Daniels defines the distinction in relation to 
“species typical” functioning, and thinks we have obligations to fund treatments that en-
sure that level of functioning but not what goes beyond it, though he offers it primarily 
for an account of what we owe one another.9 Many are skeptical of the tenability of this 
distinction, including Elhauge and I,10 and think that those who defend the distinction are 
falling prey to a classic baseline problem. If one was trying to give a sociological ac-
count as to why this line comes up again and again in the literature despite its problemat-
ic nature, one account may have to do with the ends of medicine and the organization of 
the medical professions. Physicians and nurses for a very long period of history viewed 
themselves as the curers of disease and caretakers of the diseased, not as part of the pro-
fession aimed at improving wellness more generally; more recent interventions like the 
WHO definition of “health” as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”11 may slowly be pushing the 
other way. In the early history of medical practice when health care was more likely to 
be harmful than helpful, limiting our focus to curing disease rather than promoting well-
ness may have made good prudential sense, but that is a prudential not a deep ethical rule 
and one that ought to shift with developments in health care, and in the future, with de-
velopments in the effectiveness and risks of enhancement. 
There is also a more subtle version of this distinction that is sometimes drawn in 
the literature: 
i. Enhancements to the upper bounds of what people already have vs. enhancements 
that add beyond human nature as it now stands 
Under this distinction it would be permissible to enhance one’s height to that of the 
tallest individual in one’s society, but no further. Similarly, it would be permissible to 
extend one’s life to the longest reported length, but no further. If I try to understand the 
true  motivation  for  this  view,  which  I  must  confess  has  always  struck  me  as  rather 
strange, I think it is one of three things: (i) Given that there currently exists human be-
ings who have the trait in question, by seeking it for oneself one is indisputably remain-
ing a “human being” as we now think of that concept. If, by contrast, one sought to live 
to 1,000 years old or grow wings, or something else that is currently not possessed by 
                                                 
  9.   NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 149 (2008). For another recent 
defense of this line see Dov Fox, Parental Attention Deficit Disorder, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 246, 253 (2008). 
  10.   See, e.g., Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 1, at 1225-29; Frances M. Kamm, Is There a Prob-
lem with Enhancement?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 5, 6-9 (2005) (critiquing an argument by Michael Sandel prem-
ised on the wrongfulness of desires for mastery and failure to be open to the unbidden in enhancement through 
the example of a scientist who sought to cure blindness not out of compassion but out of a desire for mastery, 
and suggesting that we do not think him to have acted immorally). 
  11.   World Health Organization, Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization, as adopted 
by the International Health Conference, New York, June 19-22, 1946 (signed on July 22, 1946 by the repre-
sentatives of sixty-one States). 
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humans one might cease to be human, which on this view seems to matter.12 (ii) There is 
a certain unfairness in terms of what our genetic endowment as individual human beings 
looks like—a certain amount of “moral luck.”13 Since the draw is random, it does not 
seem unfair (if anything it might be fairness enhancing) to “draw again” (to continue 
with the poker metaphor) from the same deck, the genetic endowment of humanity, and 
improve the hand we hold. By contrast, it feels more like cheating to seek genetic traits 
not held by any current human being, more like taking cards from a different deck and 
smuggling  them  in.  (iii)  This  principle  establishes  a  “ceiling  effect,”  which  partially 
solves a problem I will discuss just below relating to positional goods. 
f. Enhancements for Absolute vs. Positional Goods: 
This is a distinction that Elhauge’s work has focused on (he uses the terms trans-
ferred benefits and shared costs). Some goods (such as being tall) are beneficial primari-
ly in a positional sense—they are desirable to have only because others lack them. By 
contrast, other goods—for example immunity to disease—are primarily absolute goods, 
in the sense that one would want to have the enhancement even if everyone were to have 
it. In a strange way this mirrors one of Kant’s formulations of the Categorical Impera-
tive, that one should “[a]ct only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law.”14 Absolute goods are desirable even if 
they became universally available, while positional goods are desirable only because 
others are deprived of them. Most traits, though, are mixes of positional and absolute 
goods, in that they are sought to confer positional advantage and because they have abso-
lute benefit. Indeed, determining just how much a particular trait is valued for positional 
as opposed to absolute value may be quite difficult (and/or costly).         
 
* * * 
While not completely exhaustive, together this taxonomy lets us fully describe and 
categorize any enhancement: 
For example, use of Ritalin for academic testing performance when one does not 
have a diagnosis of ADHD is an enhancement (not treatment) that is biological, non-
genetic, chosen for oneself, reversible, within the bounds of what human beings currently 
possess, and is typically used primarily to secure a positional good (better performance 
on the test relative to others, though one could also imagine it being used for a test where 
everyone who passed a baseline got in, which would be more absolute). 
By contrast, a single woman who seeks a sperm donor with a very high IQ is seek-
ing an enhancement (not treatment) that is biological, genetic, chosen for someone else, 
the enhancement is done before birth, by selection, the enhancement is compatible with 
multiple possible life plans, irreversible, within the bounds of what human beings cur-
rently possess, and secures the user a mixed good that is of both positional and absolute 
                                                 
  12.   We could take the distinction further still and distinguish manipulating the intensity of a trait present in 
human beings (height, longevity) versus adding traits that are not possessed by humans to any extent at the 
moment (e.g., wings). 
  13.   Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for Bad Genes?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1348, 1350-67 (2002). 
  14.   IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (James W. Ellington trans., 3d 
ed. 1993) (originally published 1785). 
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benefit. 
Such  fully  fleshed  out  classifications  of  individual  cases  allow  us  to  examine 
whether a particular enhancement is or is not problematic in a way that should motivate 
legal/regulatory action. 
II. WHAT POSITION(S) MIGHT THE LAW TAKE ON ENHANCEMENT? 
The law might take quite different approaches to enhancement. Importantly, as 
Part I showed, because enhancement is not a unitary phenomenon, the law might adopt 
different responses to different categories of enhancement. 
To paint with a broad brush, we can categorize potential legal (or if you prefer “le-
gal/regulatory”) approaches as follows: 
a. Prohibit/Permit: 
i. Permit 
No state sanction is applied. In such a situation the state still faces a series of se-
cond order rule choices: 
1. Mandate? 
Theoretically instead of just permitting the enhancement, the state could make it 
mandatory. If vaccination is considered a kind of enhancement (as I think it should be, 
though others might disagree), this is the approach actually adopted in that domain, or at 
least it is made a precondition to attending elementary school, etc., subject to some ex-
ceptions.15 The state could also do this more surreptitiously, by adding enhancement bio-
logics to drinking water the way some municipalities add fluoride. 
2. Subsidize? 
Whether mandated or merely permitted, the state faces a second decision as to 
whether to subsidize the enhancement or require individuals to pay for them out-of-
pocket if they want it. That subsidization could in turn take the form of a true subsidy or 
something like making the enhancement a mandated benefit for insurance.16 Again, vac-
cination presents a good example. Many states require insurers to cover common vac-
cines as part of health insurance or themselves provide vaccines for free.17 
                                                 
  15.   While no federal vaccination laws exist, all fifty states require certain vaccinations for students entering 
public elementary schools. State Vaccination Requirements, CTRS.  FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/laws/state-reqs.htm (last updated Sept. 30, 2011).  
  16.   In 1999, there were 1,260 such mandates imposed by U.S. states, including mandates requiring that in-
surers cover particular benefits such as in-vitro fertilization. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 479-81 
(2d ed. 2000); I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism, Medical Tourism and the 
Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1544 (2010) [hereinafter Cohen, Medical Tourism]. 
  17.   See, e.g., Grace M. Lee et al., Gaps in Vaccine Financing for Underinsured Children in the United 
States, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 638, 641 (2007) (discussing states that do and do not require insurers to cover 
basic vaccinations for children). 
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3. Tax? 
The state could tax enhancements separately from other goods and services. If, as 
discussed below, enhancements produce externalized costs the state could tax it as a 
Pigouvian tax.18 It could also tax it in order to fund a redistributive system aimed at try-
ing to enhance the lives of those who choose not to enhance. Finally, it could tax it as a 
“vice tax” like tanning beds,19 which, come to think of it, might be thought as a kind of 
enhancement if tans improve our attractiveness!20 
4. Nudges and Other Choice Architecture Techniques 
In the spirit of Sunstein and Thaler’s “libertarian paternalism,” we might also regu-
late enhancement through nudges and other forms of choice architecture—measures that 
“influence behavior while also respecting freedom of choice” like setting default rules, or 
presenting options in certain ways.21 For example, we could add “speed bumps,” such as 
psychological prescreening or waiting or cooling off periods, similar to what is done 
with adoption, surrogacy, sex reassignment, and I have discussed, as possibilities for or-
gan markets.22 
ii. Legally Prohibit 
The state could make a particular enhancement illegal. For example, it could make 
it a criminal offense to buy, sell, or use anabolic steroids, as does the United States23 It 
could instead apply a civil fine. It could also put a cap on usage (e.g., permit individuals 
to enhance to X level but not X + 5). 
In addition or as an alternative, at least in theory, we could also adopt one of a se-
ries of “disgorgement” regimes. For reversible enhancements, the state could take them 
away. For irreversible enhancements, the state could, to be fanciful, adopt the approach 
from one of literature’s most effective ruminations on enhancement and meritocracy—
Kurt Vonnegut’s “Harrison Bergeron”—where this is the regime chosen as to existing 
better-than-average traits possessed in the society and not just enhancements. In Vonne-
                                                 
  18.   Named for the English economist Arthur Cecil Pigou, who is credited with the idea; a Pigouvian (or 
“Pigovian”) tax is used to correct a negative externality—for example, having the marginal tax rate for a unit of 
pollution reflects the negative externalities caused on a per-unit basis. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS 
OF WELFARE 192-93 (4th ed. 2002). For a discussion of the various uses of Pigouvian taxes in pollution, sin 
taxes, and other areas, see Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 523, 536-37 (2013). 
  19.   Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A-B (2012). 
  20.   Of course where a tax becomes a penalty is a fine line. Moreover, taxes may have a role in registering 
moral sanction, depending on the way the tax is “marketed.” The “individual mandate” of the Affordable Care 
Act is a good example of how this terrain is slippery and subject to reframing. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012).  
  21.   Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV.  1159,  1159-60  (2003);  see  generally  RICHARD  THALER  &  CASS  SUNSTEIN,  NUDGE:  IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
  22.   E.g., Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 1, at 470 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 
to 18 (2010)); I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating The Organ Market: Normative Foundations for Market Regulation, 
77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Cohen, Regulating the Organ Market]; see Liza 
Khan, Transgender Health at the Crossroads: Legal Norms, Insurance Markets, and the Threat of Healthcare 
Reform, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 375, 407 (2011). 
  23.   See 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2014). 
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gut’s imagined 2081: 
 
[E]verybody was finally equal. They weren’t only equal before God 
and the law. They were equal every which way. Nobody was smarter 
than anybody else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else. No-
body was stronger or quicker than anybody else. All this equality was 
due to the 211th, 212th, and 213th Amendments to the Constitution, 
and to the unceasing vigilance of agents of the United States Handicap-
per General.24 
 
In this dystopic picture, George, whose intelligence is “way above normal, had a 
little mental handicap radio in his ear” that he is “required by law to wear” at all times 
and every “twenty seconds or so, the transmitter would send out some sharp noise to 
keep people like George from taking unfair advantage of their brains.”25 A ballerina per-
forming on television must have been “[e]xtraordinarily beautiful, because the mask she 
wore was hideous. And it was easy to see that she was the strongest and most graceful of 
all the dancers, for her handicap bags were as big as those worn by two-hundred pound 
men.”26 And so on. 
 
Among the difficult questions here is how good the legal system would be at de-
tecting  prohibited  enhancements?  Take  the  (apparently)  significant  misuse  of  ADHD 
drugs by college students without diagnoses seeking to improve performance. Could col-
leges do a better job of detection, that is, is the current level of detection the result of 
lack of resources/skill, a desire to “not know,” or some combination of the two? The 
costs of detection and what headway one can make in detecting enhancements will likely 
vary significantly by type of enhancement. Biological enhancements to improve memory 
and enable card counting at casinos (to use just one example) might be harder to detect 
than, say, using Google Glass for the same purpose.  
iii. Do Not Legally Prohibit but Impose Moral Sanction 
The state could marshal some of its moral resources to sanction the practice. The 
state could make winners of contests that used enhancement return their awards, such as 
the International Olympic Committee did in the pistol competition discussed above.27 It 
could bar the use of enhancements as entry to competitions that provide honorifics. The 
current practice of sports is a good example, but similar rules could be adopted for uni-
versity admissions, orchestral performances, etc.
28 Again, detection would pose some 
                                                 
  24.   Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7 (1968). 
  25.   Id. 
  26.   Id. at 10. The state could also adopt many of the kinds of regulations it already has in place for drugs 
and devices, such as requiring testing for safety and efficacy and controlling the claims made through promo-
tion of the enhancements. 
  27.   See Scott, supra note 4. 
  28.   Of course, some measures aimed at moral censure such as government billboards might raise First 
Amendment concerns. Cf. Dov Fox, Note, Racial Classification in Assisted Reproduction, 118 YALE L. J. 
1844, 1897-98 (2009). 
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issues, as has been the case with steroid use in professional sports. 
III. WHAT (IF ANYTHING) IS WRONG WITH ENHANCEMENT? 
With these distinctions in mind, we are now ready to map the possible objections 
raised to enhancement and how they relate to the various forms of enhancement and var-
ious legal regimes. 
a. Safety/Risks to the Enhanced 
Some enhancements may pose risks for the individuals who seek to use them or 
those on whom they are imposed. This is particularly true as to genetic enhancements 
and some biological enhancements such as anabolic steroid use.29 Some biological en-
hancements, such as Ritalin use, may pose only minor risks, such as stomach pain and 
headache.30 In many cases, we are in a situation of Knightean uncertainty as to risks—
where we are uncertain as to the distribution of probabilities and not just where within a 
probability  distribution  a  risk  falls.31  Other enhancements, particularly  non-biological 
ones—such as SAT tutoring—pose no safety risks, although they are also not costless: 
students pay for the services and invest time in them. 
Of course, many enhancements also promise benefits, the key reason why they are 
being pursued. When individuals are choosing enhancements for themselves, this justifi-
cation for legal intervention is thus paternalistic. When choosing for children, the justifi-
cation for intervention is more akin to reasoning in family law where “[t]he state appro-
priately steps in, as parens patriae protector of the welfare of these non-autonomous 
persons, to act in their behalf, choosing for them” when their welfare is threatened by 
parental action.32 For those who believe in the cogency of the treatment-enhancement 
line, the more treatment-like the intervention sought by the parents, the more legal rea-
soning about the case can draw from court decisions on health care decision-making for 
                                                 
  29.   See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Biotech Death of Jesse Gelsinger, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/28/magazine/the-biotech-death-of-jesse-
gelsinger.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (describing the well-known 1999 case of Jesse Gelsinger, who died 
while undergoing experimental gene therapy at the University of Pennsylvania that attempted to correct for a 
genetic defect that prevented him from correctly metabolizing ammonia); Anabolic Steroids, NAT’L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH,  http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/anabolicsteroids.html;  Anabolic  Steroids,  MERCK  MANUAL 
HOME HEALTH HANDBOOK, http://www.merckmanuals.com/home/special_subjects/drug_use_and_abuse/ ana-
bolic_steroids.html (discussing risks of steroid use) (last updated Jan. 2009). But see Anjan Chatterjee, Cosmet-
ic Neurology: The Controversy over Enhancing Movement, Mentation, and Mood, 63 NEUROLOGY 968, 970 
(2004):  
While safety concerns are undoubtedly real, they are unlikely to have much of a practical 
impact. The incentives to develop new treatments with minimal side effects are in place. 
This is not to say that unexpected effects might not be encountered. But, in general, new-
er medications will continue to be safer, and the safer the medication, the less relevant 
this concern. 
  30.   Methylphenidate,  NAT’L  INSTS.  OF  HEALTH,  http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/ 
meds/a682188.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).  
  31.   See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921); see also Chris William 
Sanchirico, Optimal Tax Policy and the Symmetries of Ignorance, 66 TAX L. REV. 1, 56 (2012). 
  32.   James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued Consignment of Newborn Babies to 
Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 411 (2008); see Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 1, at 435-
36. 
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children, including case law on experimental therapies.33 
I will note here, though not elaborate in detail, one wrinkle as to (at least) pre-birth 
enhancement done through selection, and perhaps some forms of pre-birth enhancement 
done by radical genetic manipulation. As I have argued elsewhere, we cannot be said to 
harm someone through reproduction if they are given a life worth living, if in order to 
“prevent”  that  “harm”  we  would  have  to  bring  someone  else  into  existence  in  their 
place.34 This is the mistake of Best Interests of the Resulting Child (“BIRC”) reasoning I 
have attacked elsewhere.
35 To illustrate, suppose we are discussing an attempt to effectu-
ate an enhancement of offspring by selection of gametes. Suppose a single woman seeks 
a sperm donor with a high IQ, or other desired trait, for reproduction. Suppose, for some 
reason, that using that donor sperm also carries with it an increased risk of some disad-
vantageous condition, like a clubbed foot or paraplegia. Has the woman harmed the child 
by pursuing that enhancement? Even if it is conceded that the child is, on balance, worse 
off with the high IQ and the disadvantaging condition as compared to a child born from a 
different sperm donor who would have had neither trait, that does not mean this child 
was harmed.36 So long as I am given a life worth living, I am not harmed if my counter-
factual to existing was not existing at all and instead another (genetically speaking) child 
being created in my place. For that reason, when enhancement is accomplished by selec-
tion, we cannot say that preventing that enhancement can be justified for safety reasons 
to prevent harm to the resulting child. Now there may be other theories as to why we 
want to prevent the creation of children with less-good-welfare than might have been 
possible—theories of non-person-affecting principle approaches or reproductive exter-
nalities that I have canvassed and critically evaluated elsewhere.37 One problematic im-
plication of such theories that I have highlighted in other work, though, which may be 
particularly salient here, is that these theories may ultimately justify state-mandated en-
hancement, something anathema to those opposing human enhancement that may make 
them suspect as ways of rehabilitating the safety argument. 
b. Distribution and Inequality 
When enhancements are available for purchase, there is a risk that they will lead to 
distributional injustice and worsening inequality;38 or, as Leonard Cohen poetically put it 
                                                 
  33.   E.g., Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978); In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 
1979); Children’s Soc’y of Peel Region v. B. (C.), [1988] W.D.F.L. 794 (Ont. Prov. Ct. Fm. Ct. Div.); see I. 
Glenn Cohen, Medical Tourism for Experimental Therapies: An In-Depth Exploration of Stem Cell Therapy 
Tourism, in PATIENTS WITH PASSPORTS: MEDICAL TOURISM, ETHICS AND LAW (forthcoming 2014). 
  34.   See Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 1; Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 1; Cohen, 
Rethinking Sperm Donor Anonymity, supra note 1. 
  35.   See Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 1; Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 1; Cohen, 
Rethinking Sperm Donor Anonymity, supra note 1. 
  36.   For this reason the child cannot be said to be harmed even if the pursued enhancement does not suc-
ceed, so the clubbed foot obtains but not the intelligence in the example. 
  37.   See Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 1; Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 1. 
  38.   E.g., Dov Fox, The Illiberality Of ‘Liberal Eugenics’, 20 RATIO 1, 17 (2007) [hereinafter Fox, The Illib-
erality of ‘Liberal Eugenics’] (noting the worry: “that limited access to high-priced enhancement technologies 
confers genetic advantages only on offspring whose parents can afford them, thereby exacerbating inequality 
and unfairness in competitions for scarce benefits and prized roles. ‘The ability to buy not only tools and op-
portunities to cultivate one’s native capacities, but also to buy new or enhanced capacities themselves,’ argues 
Erik Parens, ‘would make some individuals doubly-strong competitors for many of life’s goods.’”). Id. (quot-
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“[e]verybody knows the fight was fixed/ The poor stay poor, the rich get rich/ That’s 
how  it  goes/  Everybody  knows.”39  This  risk  cuts  across  essentially  all  forms  of  en-
hancements—from cosmetic surgery to SAT tutoring. It is perhaps a bit more salient as 
to enhancement for positional goods, since they are desirable precisely because they pro-
duce increased inequality, but the point holds for enhancement for absolute goods as 
well—these are enhancements which give to the receiver benefits that are objectively 
valuable, but in so doing they very often will also improve her status relative to others. 
Also relevant in this analysis is the marginal cost of the enhancement (both in monetary 
and health terms); the lower the cost the less it provides advantages to those who can af-
ford it, and perhaps the less valued it would be for “positional” purposes since everyone 
can access it—that said, perhaps the more salient the problem of “coercion of voluntary 
enhancement” discussed below.   
One intervention that combats this concern is to prohibit the enhancement in ques-
tion. The state could also diminish this concern by subsidizing the enhancement in ques-
tion. The state could require all insurers to cover Lasiks eye surgery, Ritalin, (and to be 
provocative) breast augmentation, and anabolic steroid use. It could also require that all 
SAT tutoring companies engage in need-blind admission into their programs and pro-
duce a system of fee waivers for qualifying students who cannot afford entry similar to 
what is done with college admission fees. In that latter case the subsidy would be pro-
gressive and only available to those who show need, a slightly different approach to 
avoiding inequality. 
Such subsidized enhancements could, in theory, either be voluntary “free for the 
taking” or mandated. The latter would be more controversial in that it would raise liber-
tarian concerns about interference with freedom over one’s body. For this reason, man-
datory enhancements are likely to be disfavored, but one area where that preference 
against them may run into trouble is the limited category of biological enhancements that 
must be done pre-birth or in early childhood. In such a case, parents who refused to en-
hance their child may set that child back relative to his peers in a way that is not chosen 
by the child and may not be correctable later on. Here, to me, the most compelling anal-
ogies are to early childhood education and the case law as well as political theoretical 
discussion of when parents can choose not to enroll their children in schools.40 
A point that is sometimes overlooked is that enhancement can also be a way of 
overcoming  distributional  injustice  and  reducing  inequality.  As Rakowski notes after 
canvassing leading political theories, for many theories “those who are better off owe 
redress to those whose genes substantially curtail their opportunities” and that “[r]edress 
may take the form of special education, medical assistance, or welfare benefits if they are 
unable to obtain employment.”41 Enhancement enables a different kind of redress that 
                                                                                                                       
ing Erik Parens, Justice and the Germline, in ENGINEERING THE HUMAN GERMLINE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE 
SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF ALTERING THE GENES WE PASS TO OUR CHILDREN 122, 123 (Gregory Stock & John 
Campbell eds., 2000)). 
  39.   LEONARD COHEN, Everybody Knows, on I’M YOUR MAN (Columbia Records 1988). 
  40.   See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-22, 230-34 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 165-66 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
401 (1923); Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 1, at 436-37. 
  41.   Rakowski, supra note 13, at 1354 (citing NORMAN DANIELS, AM I MY PARENTS' KEEPER? AN ESSAY 
ON JUSTICE BETWEEN THE YOUNG AND THE OLD 66-82 (1988); NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 36-58 
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may be more efficient. Why compensate individuals for bad genetic luck, for example, 
when we can instead correct the “root problem” and improve the hand that they were 
dealt? 
On this view, subsidization of access to enhancement should not necessarily track 
wealth and lack of ability-to-pay but instead a more “luck egalitarian” concept. Very 
roughly speaking, “luck egalitarianism” is the idea that individuals should not be held 
responsible for “brute luck” things they could not help (such as genetic traits), but should 
be held responsible for “option luck” choices they do make.42 Applied here, those with 
bad  brute  luck  as  to  their  traits  should  receive  subsidized  enhancement  (or  perhaps 
should be the only ones allowed to access that enhancement). 
Such an approach would then face a second order question related to the issue of 
“separate spheres.” For those who adopt “separate spheres” views on distributive justice, 
access to enhancement should be keyed to a deficit as to that domain of well-being or 
trait (e.g., SAT tutoring only for those with lower IQs); for those who reject such views 
and are willing to accept a more flexible “currency” of redistribution, enhancements in 
one domain could be used to make up for deficits in another domain (e.g., SAT tutoring 
for those who are very short, cosmetic surgery improving facial features for those born 
with autism, etc.), or on the broadest conception, even forms of bad moral luck that have 
nothing to do with traits.43 
c. The Coercion of Voluntary Enhancements (not Oxymoronic!) 
Suppose that enhancements were safe, provided benefits to those who got them, 
and were costless (both in terms of their cost to the user, for example, because they were 
fully subsidized, and in terms of their externalities). Suppose further that the state did not 
mandate that individuals take them. At least in terms of freedom and distribution, one 
might think that there would then be nothing wrong with making such enhancements 
available. This configuration is sometimes described as a regime of “liberal eugenics,” 
an “ideal of genetic control which leaves decisions about what kinds of people to pro-
duce in the hands of parents, absent government intervention.”44 This program has three 
key defining features: it is “(1) voluntary, (2) individualistic, and (3) state-neutral”45 (at 
least in the sense that the state does not mandate it; as I use it liberal eugenics is compat-
ible with state subsidization). 
                                                                                                                       
(1985); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60-61, 76-80 (1971)). 
  42.   See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287 (1999); Daniel Mar-
kovitz, Luck Egalitarianism and Political Solidarity, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 271 (2008); see generally 
SHLOMI SEGALL, HEALTH, LUCK, AND JUSTICE (2010). There are other questions, to be sure, pertaining to the 
use of enhancement to reduce inequality that I will only gesture at here. For example would we enable en-
hancements that raise people to a threshold of sufficiency on particular valued things like intelligence, to the 
highest amount of that thing attained by a living being, or by a fixed amount? Should some level of levelling be 
down be considered? This would depend (at least in part) on one’s views on other key moral theory distinctions 
about equality, for example between Egalitarians, Prioritarians, and Sufficientarians.  
  43.   For in-depth discussions of the separate spheres issue as to distributional justice, see, e.g., Dan W. 
Brock,  Separate  Spheres  and  Indirect  Benefits,  Cost  Effectiveness  &  Resource  Allocation,  1  COST 
EFFECTIVENESS & RES. ALLOCATION 4 (2003), available at http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/1/1/4; 
I. Glenn Cohen, Rationing Legal Services, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 221, 248-50 (2013). 
  44.   Fox, The Illiberality of ‘Liberal Eugenics’, supra note 38, at 2. 
  45.   Id. at 3. 
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What could be wrong with allowing individuals to enhance in such a setting if the 
person making the choice is enhancing themselves, rather than enhancing a child or other 
person who cannot choose? 
In what will seem like a contradiction in terms, there is a potential objection of 
“coercion” with “voluntary enhancement.”46 To illustrate, imagine a good that is distrib-
uted in a zero-sum way, be it money, a job, a meaningful romantic relationship, etc. Im-
agine a population of one hundred identically situated individuals. If fifty of those indi-
viduals choose to enhance, they increase their share of the zero-sum goods. The other 
individuals in the population must enhance in order to compete. The result is a new equi-
librium where everyone enhances, or at least many choose to enhance who would not 
choose to enhance but-for the need to compete with the enhanced in a zero-sum distribu-
tion, and those who fail to enhance will suffer in terms of the distribution. In some ways 
the dynamic is similar to one argument for imposing a minimum wage. It prevents the 
wage from being bargained down in the competition for jobs, and it protects a good that 
(some, at least) value—a baseline wage payment.47 
This dynamic of what I call “coerced voluntary enhancement” is not hypothetical. 
One good example comes from the world of sports, where some use steroids and other 
performance enhancing drugs to avoid “playing naked” when others are enhancing.48 
Another example comes from mental enhancement, where Chatterjee noted a study that 
showed: 
 
[P]ilots taking donepezil performed better in emergencies than those on 
placebo could have wide implications. If these results are reliable and 
significant, should pilots be expected to take such medications? Can 
airline executives require this of pilots? Would they offer financial in-
centives to pilots willing to take these medications? Will the public, 
fearful of flying, pay more for cholinergic copilots? Closer to home, 
should post-call residents take modafinil to attenuate deficits in sus-
tained attention brought on by sleep deprivation?49 
 
I think these two examples are interesting tests of conflicting intuitions. As a de-
scriptive matter, the dynamic seems correct: competition with the enhanced where the 
enhanced are rewarded with something valued will inevitably lead some individuals to 
themselves enhance simply for the sake of remaining competitive. 
But is that a moral problem? Imagine that pilots who took the drug in question re-
ally were better pilots. Why wouldn’t we want that competitive coercive dynamic to take 
hold if the enhancement was completely safe and costless? If one were to imagine the 
protest of the pilot who did not want to enhance (certainly not the way the pilot would 
put it!) the claim would be something like: “I have a right not to enhance and improve 
                                                 
  46.   See, e.g., Chatterjee, supra note 29, at 971-72. 
  47.   That is, in the minimum-wage context, given enough providers of labor every individual might feel 
pressure to accept the below-minimum-wage offer for fear that everyone else will, such that the system unrav-
els to the point where everyone is below minimum wage. Cohen, Medical Tourism, supra note 16, at 1535. 
  48.   E.g., Chatterjee, supra note 29, at 971. 
  49.   Id. 
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the safety of passengers, and the fact that it makes me a worse pilot and makes it more 
likely that my plane will crash, should not count against me in competing for this job.” 
Perhaps I am hard-hearted, but I do not find that plea all that sympathetic. We would re-
ject a similar claim by that pilot not to practice on a flight simulator, for example, a non-
biological form of enhancement. To claim a moral difference between the two cases 
(drug vs. flight simulator) he will have to offer a claim that biological and non-biological 
enhancements have morally significant differences, but I think that is a hard row to hoe 
once we have held safety and cost constant. 
But notice that in the pilot example the good is a mixed one with a significant ab-
solute benefit (it produces safer air flight and reaction to emergency which would be de-
sirable for all pilots to have) and also positive externalities (safer flying for passengers). 
Let us instead consider the football case. I, your humble author, am about 5’9.5” (I cling 
to that “.5” tenaciously!) and weigh roughly 160 pounds (I shudder at re-reading this es-
say in years to come when that weight will seem like an unattainable idyll from a much 
heavier viewpoint). Given my current body, there is no doubt that I would never be able 
to play NFL football (well, perhaps as a kicker!). Many players in this and other sports 
are born with genotypes that produce phenotypes much better suited to their sports than 
mine will ever be (Michael Phelps’ unusual wing span among others comes to mind).50 
Their genotypes are a matter of moral luck—why shouldn’t I be allowed to compete with 
them by evening out with enhancement what genetics gave them? One might even say 
that denying me an enhancement leads me to be the victim of two injustices, the first ge-
netic,  the  second  regulatory,  both  of  which  prevent  me  from  pursuing  a  desired  life 
plan.
51 
One objection to this argument is that permitting me to enhance might lead to an 
“arms race” where all want-to-be NFL players enhance. Again, though, I wonder, what 
would be so bad about that? If there are safety risks or significant cost involved, then I 
can see a problem. And perhaps to avoid a constant one-up-manship we would want to 
create a ceiling to the enhancement (such as enhancement up to the highest level of a 
natural-born human being), as well as to neutralize the fact that we began at different 
starting points. But beyond that, why would it be bad? One answer, given by Elhauge, 
discussed below has to do with externalized costs from this competitive dynamic. That 
strikes me as promising, but if we were to stipulate zero externalized costs and zero costs 
                                                 
  50.   Mark Levine, Out There, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008,   
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/sports/playmagazine/803PHELPS-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;  
Steve Parry, What makes Phelps so special?,   BBC SPORTS OLYMPICS BLOG (Aug. 13, 2008),   
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/olympics/2008/08/can_anyone_spoil_phelps_pool_p.html.  
  51.   Dov Fox writes: 
As Elizabeth Anderson observes, no one believes that ugly people, for example, should 
be compensated with publicly subsidized plastic surgery or sexual relations just because 
they face challenges in the pursuit of romance, through no fault of their own.
 
An im-
portant measure of luck, I submit, is what gives meaning and value to many of the goods 
things in human life. Vulnerability to the contingency of luck, especially genetic luck, 
plays an ineliminable moral role in some of our most cherished institutions and practices. 
Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 568, 601 (2007) (citing Anderson, supra note 
42, at 305). I must confess I fail to understand why he does not think the way we look, our self-esteem, and the 
consequences for our professional and romantic lives are not as important as, say, susceptibility to a rare dis-
ease or a heart defect which do ordinarily give us a right to call on society to make us whole.  
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to the person who enhances (just to isolate other moral objections), again I ask why 
would it be bad? 
d. The Love of Randomness: Sandel (and Others) on the Distribution of Honorifics in 
Sport 
One answer comes from Michael Sandel, who, among others, has argued that part 
of the telos (to use the Aristotelian term) of football and other competitive sports is its 
inequality, the random distribution of talent.52 But that is just the convention of our cur-
rent sport. Who is to say it would not be better if the abilities of all players were evenly 
matched, and other random forces were what decided matches, such as the direction of 
the wind at a given moment? 
But, to play devil’s advocate, let us grant that something would be lost if all play-
ers were allowed to use (by assumption safe and free) performance enhancing drugs. 
Perhaps sports fans just inherently enjoy the game as it is, and cheer on the g-dlike tal-
ents of some of the players and would enjoy the sport less if they believed they too could 
achieve that prowess through enhancement. Let us return to my very un-football like 
body. Suppose, and this too I fear is a pipe dream, that through a killer gym routine and 
dietary modification as well as significant coaching I could become ready for the NFL. It 
would require me to train 325 days a year for five hours a day. Imagine I undertake this 
Herculean effort. Would Michael Sandel and others cheer me on when I mount the field 
and move from law nerd to football hero? No doubt. But training in that way is just as 
much an enhancement as ingesting a pill. 
What is the moral difference between the two? One answer might be “effort.” 
Weightlifting Cohen “earned” those muscles while pill-popping Cohen cheated. Again, 
there is an element of moral luck here—some people’s bodies will respond better to 
weight lifting regimes than others, so even on this “sweat equity” (if you will pardon the 
pun) theory perhaps those with less-responsive bodies are entitled to a chemical en-
hancement to make up the difference. But put that to one side, and imagine that every-
one’s body reacted the same way—that like Charles Atlas might have claimed, we could 
all be Olympians. 
Would we be right to think that pill-popping Cohen had not “earned” his physique? 
Imagine the pills were quite expensive and to afford them I needed to take on a second 
job that required me to work hard for an additional five hours a day for 325 days a year. 
Now both pill-popping and weightlifting Cohen seem to be investing the same amount of 
equity. Why is one path better than the other? 53 
Indeed, we can alter the example slightly. Suppose pill-popping Cohen has to work 
six hours a day for those 325 days a year to afford the pills. Has he not, if anything, 
worked harder to earn that physique than did weightlifting Cohen? And if in fact the pills 
are cheaper, and pill-popping Cohen has to work only one hour for 325 days for the pills 
                                                 
  52.    SANDEL, supra note 2, at 36-44. 
  53.   Of course it is open for someone to suggest that neither earned their gains, because genes, success, dis-
position, are all products of things external to them and not under their control; all brute luck. Even if true and 
relevant, for present purposes the only claim I seek to make is that each has roughly equally “earned” the phy-
sique. Even if one concludes that neither has earned it, 0 = 0.  
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and thus saves four hours a day compared to his weight-lifting counterpoint, might that 
actually be better? He has more time to read to the blind, help little old ladies cross the 
street, etc. (positive externalities) or for leisure.
54 Remember that as it is for some people, 
one hour of working out will be the equivalent of two, three, or four hours for others. 
They too are able to be “more efficient” like pill-popping Cohen in this last variant. I 
have yet to see anyone, out of inspiration from Vonnegut’s Harrison Bergeron
55 perhaps, 
call for those able to build muscle faster to be penalized in the competition by hanging 
weights onto them that nullify their advantage and/or applying muscle atrophy creams to 
their bodies. For these reasons even if inequality and effort were important for the telos 
of sport, I do not see why that provides a strong argument against enhancement. 
e. Compassion, Solidarity, and Responsibility 
Let us move our lens from sports to healthcare. Suppose an enhancement was de-
veloped that improved healthcare significantly. To use a real tangible example, suppose a 
vaccine for HIV is finally successfully developed. If you believe that this is a “treatment” 
and not an “enhancement” and that there is a morally significant difference (again like 
Elhauge, I am a skeptic about this distinction), we can imagine more clear examples of 
enhancements along these lines: there is a treatment that will let you survive on one-fifth 
of the calories your body currently requires without any ill effects, or there is an adaman-
tium injection that makes our bones harder to break (like a certain Marvel character). 
In such cases, Sandel, among others, has worried about the failure of compassion 
and solidarity and the ascription of responsibility to these individuals. He reasons that the 
more chance involved in our life choices, the more reason we have to share our fate with 
others. He worries that enhancement erodes solidarity. He suggests that the reason why 
the better-off accept that they owe things to the less well-off is because they know that 
their natural talents are not their own doing, they have been lucky, but that this impulse 
will not be carried forward with enhancement because we will hold them responsible for 
their failure to enhance.56 
I see several problems with this line of argument. First, it seems limited to only 
certain kinds of enhancement situations. In particular, where enhancement is mandatory 
the problem does not manifest since everyone will be enhanced. Where enhancements 
                                                 
  54.   Cf. Fox, supra note 51, at 595:  
[F]oregoing the opportunity for striving may be morally acceptable, or perhaps even de-
sirable, even if we do miss out on some of the associated value that the traditional means 
would have brought forth. The reason is that the end state itself may have such value that 
achieving  it  without  recourse  to  a  worthy  struggle  would  be  morally  better  than  not 
achieving that end at all. For example, a person’s overcoming laziness by taking a pill 
might be better, for the individual, than his remaining lazy, although not as good as learn-
ing diligence through effort and determination. 
  55.   See Vonnegut, supra note 24. 
  56.   See SANDEL, supra note 2, at 87-92. A parallel concern offered by others is what such enhancement 
programs will do as to solidarity/support for those with disabilities. E.g., Fox, supra note 51, at 621-22. This 
concern can also be re-characterized as one of consequentialist corruption discussed below. The answers I offer 
in this section and that later one, I think, also respond to this parallel argument. This kind of argument might 
also problematically imply that it is important to keep having children with disability, and perhaps to try to 
block genetic screening or pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, in order to secure enough “foot soldiers” for the 
disability rights movement and securing of benefits for them. For some that implication will provide a further 
reason to be suspicious of this kind of argument. 
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are not subsidized we may still feel compassion to those who are unable to afford the en-
hancement just as we currently do to those unable to afford housing, education, etc. 
But imagine there is a subsidized voluntary enhancement program; does that mean 
individuals will be held responsible and deprived of resources if they choose not to en-
hance? Frances Kamm has emphasized that this does not follow. She gives the example 
of someone who is electrocuted after stupidly using a blow dryer in a bathtub. She thinks 
Sandel confuses responsibility in the sense of blame and the sense of bearing of costs and 
notes that the bather “being at fault in a minor way does not mean that he forfeits a claim 
on others he otherwise had to free medical care.”57 That is, “[s]imilarly, if someone for 
reasons of conscience refuses to take advantage of the option to abort a difficult preg-
nancy, we do not think that she should forfeit medical care simply because she could 
have avoided the need for it.”58 Kamm, correctly in my view, thinks that Sandel has mis-
takenly located the duty to aid in the fact that they are the victims of bad luck, when she 
thinks “the duty to aid others seem[s] to have more to do with respect and concern for the 
value of other persons than with whether they have or have not gotten themselves into 
whatever situation they are in.”59 
But suppose Sandel were to re-frame his argument as not being about what we owe 
each other in a deeper moral sense but instead as a descriptive account of likely human 
reactions, even if those reactions are concededly not what morality would actually re-
quire, a kind of error theorem. Would that count as an argument against enhancements 
that were safe, costless, and available to all? I think not for three reasons.  
First, notice that this problem only applies to some forms of enhancement where 
we can ascribe responsibility to the person who is seeking to make a claim on us or who 
seeks or compassion/solidarity. For example, in the case of enhancing children, it is un-
clear why parental decisions to fail to enhance the child should reduce our psychological 
feelings of compassion or solidarity with them; indeed it seems just as plausible that it 
will have the opposite effect. 
Second, if we are talking just about mistaken human inclination, it is unclear to me 
why such priors cannot be re-educated through nudges or public awareness campaigns. 
Indeed, perhaps there are enhancements we will discover to improve precisely this kind 
of reasoning! 
Second, even if we thought such priors were un-eradicable, it is not clear to me 
that given a choice of furthering these kinds of dispositions but having the enhancements 
or solidarity without them, that we would always choose the latter. To use a dramatic ex-
ample, suppose that by swallowing one pill without any untoward side effects you could 
become impervious to all pathogens and die peacefully of old age in excellent health at 
age 110. Such a pill would not only improve the welfare of those who take it but also 
would produce significant positive externalities (or, if you prefer, reduce significant neg-
ative externalities of the pre-pill baseline): my bad health imposes significant costs on 
others—family who must tend to my health, employers who face my loss of productivi-
ty, others to whom I transmit infection, etc. By taking the pill I have improved my wel-
                                                 
  57.   Kamm, supra note 10, at 12. 
  58.   Id. at 13. 
  59.   Id. 
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fare and the welfare of others around me. If we assume arguendo that this could only be 
accomplished by heaping scorn (e.g., by making them social pariahs) and/or reducing 
resources devoted to those “naturalists” who refused to take the pill, would that be an 
overwhelming reason to ban the pill or not pursue its development? To me it certainly 
seems not. Indeed, it may be possible to take some of the resources saved from the use of 
the pill and improve those people’s health care, a form of growing the pie. 
Even if that were not the case, even if we concede that the “naturalists” would be 
worse off as compared to a world where the pill was unavailable, so what? That should 
only bother us if we think they have a rights claim not to take the pill. That rights claim 
seems to me to be predicated on what in the law we like to call a “baseline” problem. 
What is so special about the existing baseline of our lifespan and disease immunity as it 
stands now? It was quite different in 44 AD, 1776, and will be quite different again in 
2081. What is the moral significance of our current state? 
To see why this rights claim seems problematically predicated on a baseline prob-
lem, let us turn the world upside down. Imagine that we all are currently immune from 
all diseases and die in good health at 110. A pill is developed, though, that will change 
our immune systems to resemble those currently enjoyed in the real world. Would you 
have a rights claim to take the pill in question? Perhaps if you believe in a right to sui-
cide or to control one’s body by ingesting whatever you please, even if the government 
makes it illegal. Would you have a rights claim to take the pill and avoid the heaping of 
scorn or reduction in access to resources? That seems quite doubtful to me. Would you 
have a rights claim to make everyone in your society take the pill because if they don’t 
you will be disadvantaged in terms of the coercion versus competition dynamic dis-
cussed above. Certainly not. 
The baseline problem here seems to be the mistake of making an undefended ap-
peal to nature, that what is natural is good. That is: 
 
Even if we can agree that some things are natural and some are not, 
what follows from this? The answer is: nothing. There is no factual 
reason to suppose that what is natural is good (or at least better) and 
what is unnatural is bad (or at least worse).60  
 
Such a claim is particularly hard in the health domain, because so many of the innova-
tions we have developed already (antibiotics, for example) seek to forestall the natural. 
While it is open to enhancement critics to draw a strong line between treatment 
versus enhancement, that line is very hard to defend. As Kamm, for example, has put it: 
 
The assumption behind [this view which she associates with Sandel] is 
that nature is sacred and should be honored. But why should we believe 
this? Cancer cells, AIDS, tornadoes, and poisons are all parts of nature. 
Are they sacred and to be honored? The natural and the good are dis-
tinct conceptual categories and the two can diverge: the natural can fail 
                                                 
  60.   JULIAN BAGGINI, MAKING SENSE: PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE HEADLINES 181-82 (2002).  
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to be good and the good can be unnatural (e.g., art, dams, etc.). Sup-
pose nature was sacred and to be honored. We would clearly be over-
riding its dictates by making people able to resist (by immunization) 
illnesses that they could not naturally resist. Is doing this impermissible 
because it does not honor nature? Surely not.61 
f. Externalities 
Owing no doubt in part to his background in law and economics and the fact that 
some who write in this domain are hostile to or not well-versed in these methods, in his 
unpublished work Elhauge has suggested that the chief problem with enhancement lies in 
the way it creates externalities for other. He beautifully weaves together the distinction 
between absolute and positional benefits with the notion of the competitive coercion dy-
namic I discussed above. As he writes, we should be concerned about enhancement in: 
 
situations where we cannot trust individuals to weigh the benefits and 
costs of their biological interventions because many of those effects are 
external to them. In particular, sometimes part or all of benefits are 
transferred to them from others or part or all of the costs are shifted 
from them onto others. As a result, individuals who consider only the 
benefits and costs they personally experience will be agreeing to bio-
logical interventions that impose a net harm, including a net harm on 
themselves once one considers that other individuals will undergo simi-
lar biological interventions that inflict a net harm back. 
* * *  
In  sports  competition,  the  benefits  to  the  beta-blocker  user  reflect  a 
transfer of benefits from others. Only one athlete can win each Olympic 
medal. If one athlete wins by taking a beta-blocker, then that merely 
transfers that benefit to the using athlete from some non-using athlete. 
The use of the beta-blocker may seem like it has a large benefit to the 
individual user, but it creates a zero total benefit to the set of all per-
sons. If the other athletes respond by also taking beta-blockers (as they 
are likely to if it becomes permissible), then all the athletes will have 
their accuracy improved similarly and the beta-blockers are unlikely to 
alter who wins. If so, then beta-blocker usage will provide not only ze-
ro total benefit to all athletes, but zero individual benefit to each athlete 
person as well. Each athlete nonetheless will have incentives to take the 
beta-blockers because the individual athlete considers only whether the 
benefits they personally experience from their own individual usage 
decision outweigh the health risks and costs to themselves. The collec-
tive result is that athletes suffer health risks and costs in return for zero 
total and perhaps zero individual benefit as well. Those health risks and 
                                                 
  61.   Kamm, supra note 10, at 8-9.  
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costs may not be large, but suffering them for zero benefit is something 
we should want to deter. 
 
In classical music, in contrast, the benefits are not mainly mere benefit 
transfers. To be sure, there are only so many slots on each orchestra, so 
that part of each musician’s motivation for taking beta-blockers doubt-
less  reflects  benefit  transfers.  But  beta-blocker  usage  also  creates  a 
powerful absolute benefit even if all musicians use them: their perfor-
mances sound better to audiences. Given this significant absolute bene-
fit and the small health risks and costs, it seems quite plausible that 
most musicians who use beta-blockers would still choose to do so even 
if they enjoyed none of the transferred benefits. We thus lack a strong 
reason to deter the usage of beta- blockers by classical musicians. 
 
Here, then, is the central idea of this book. We should disapprove of ef-
forts to re-engineer human biology whenever we believe that most per-
sons who engage in such re-engineering would not do so without trans-
ferred  benefits  or  shifted  costs.  Transferred  benefits  are  gains  from 
human re-engineering that reflect transfers of value from others, and 
thus result in no value for anyone if everyone engages in the reengi-
neering. Shifted costs are harms from human engineering that are in-
flicted on others. In contrast, absolute benefits are gains from human 
re-engineering that would be enjoyed even if others obtained the same 
biological improvement. Unshifted costs are costs from re-engineering 
that the user suffers personally.62 
 
This intellectual move in some senses shifts enhancement from a sui generis bio-
ethics issue pressing us to consider the new issues posed by reconfiguring human beings 
to instead make the issue one more in a series of familiar problems from economics and 
game theory related to collective action and externalities. 
This is not the place to consider deeply and potentially critique Elhauge’s contribu-
tion, in part because he has not yet finished the manuscript (though I, among others, hope 
it will be completed soon). Instead, I will content myself with three observations: 
First, one need not believe (as Elhauge does) that this is the only or main problem 
with enhancement to find this contribution valuable. It is a useful insight even if one 
thought this to be merely one among a series of problems with enhancements, and one 
that singles out enhancements with positional value and shifted costs. 
Second, if the enhancement problem ends up being largely an externalities one, 
then one solution that presents itself is the one endorsed by law and economics in other 
instances of externalized costs: get the person generating the cost to internalize the exter-
nality and pay for the full cost of their activity. In some instances this can be achieved 
without too much design difficulty—for example using a Pigouvian tax on those who use 
                                                 
  62.   Einer Elhauge, unpublished manuscript, at 9 (on file with the author).  
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the enhancements that cause health risks to the extent they involve positional and not ab-
solute benefits and re-investing the proceeds in funds for health care to deal with some of 
the negative effects of that enhancement. Indeed it may be most efficient to set the tax at 
a level that discourages consumption of such enhancements altogether. In other instanc-
es, though, the harm involved will be hard to monetize. Suppose a particular enhance-
ment for muscle growth desirable for playing a professional sport also makes the indi-
vidual  who  enhances  more  likely  to  be  aggressive  and  increases  by  ten  percent  the 
chance that the player will physically abuse a romantic partner. While we could tax the 
enhancement in that case and try to compensate the romantic partners who do get abused, 
doing so would be fairly difficult and raise questions as to whether the compensation 
makes them whole, on which opinions will likely diverge. 
Third, if forcing the internalization of externalities is difficult to do in a particular 
case—because it will be difficult to quantify the externality, because it will be difficult to 
recompense the victim, etc.—it may be that bans are justified on a theory of the second 
best. That raises two questions: first one of level of generality—do we ban enhancement, 
biological enhancement, biological enhancement for primarily positional goods, biologi-
cal enhancement for the primarily positional good of muscle growth ?—and second it 
depends on, for the relevant category “size,” having a prior as to how much of the activi-
ty we will govern is externality-causing, how large the externality will, and how much is 
gained. This is the bread-and-butter of legal and moral discourse on over and under-
inclusivity, and thinking on those subjects can guide in thinking about what to proscribe 
when the more subtle regulatory tools are unavailable. 
Finally, I think the notion of transferred costs is particularly interesting and worth 
further exploration in the sub-set of enhancements involving enhancing our children. 
One interesting questions is to what extent parents currently internalize the externalized 
costs of the enhancement they foist on their children. When it comes to SAT tutoring, 
piano lessons, or the current group of non-biological enhancements, parents pay the fi-
nancial costs, the time cost of transporting children, and may be on the receiving end of 
significant amounts of child resentment. The same may be true of biological enhance-
ments should they become more common. Currently, I think it is fair to say, American 
family law only rarely seeks to monetize the externalities involved in reproduction or 
child rearing. 
g. Arguments Specific to Enhancements Imposed on Those Who Cannot Choose 
(Especially Children) 
A further set of arguments are, I think, applicable only to the sub-category of en-
hancements related to those who cannot choose, most commonly arguments about the 
choice of parents to enhance their children. 
i. Disfiguring the Parent-Child Relationship and Other Forms of Corruption 
Michael Sandel has forcefully suggested that the true problem with enhancement 
“lies  in  the  hubris  of  the  designing  parents,  in  their  drive  to  master  the  mystery  of 
birth . . . [because] it disfigures the relation between parent and child, and deprives the 
parent of the humility and enlarged human sympathies that an openness to the unbidden 
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can cultivate.”63 
One might distinguish two versions of this argument. The first is that this “disfig-
uring” is bad because it sets back the interests of the child, that children are harmed by 
the weight of parental desires. As a threshold matter, even if these parental pressures set 
back the welfare of the child we must compare it to the welfare benefit to the child of the 
enhancement.64 But let us imagine the child is, on balance, more harmed by the parental 
pressure than benefitted by the enhancement, still the argument runs into the same prob-
lem as other Best Interests of the Resulting Child arguments at least as to pre-birth en-
hancement by selection. If the child in question would not exist but for the enhancement, 
and instead a different child would exist in its place, then even if existing paired with 
these inappropriate parental pressures is bad (so long as it does not give rise to a life not 
worth living) we cannot say the child is harmed by the enhancements. 
The second version of the argument, which I think is closer to Sandel’s actual in-
tent, is that the disfigurement is not bad for the child per se but instead that it corrupts the 
ideal of parenthood. This version has echoes in Leon Kass’ Wisdom of Repugnance, 
which offers a more religious-sounding analogue to Sandel’s critique. As Kass writes: 
 
Repugnance  .  .  .  revolts  against  the  excesses  of  human  willfulness, 
warning us not to transgress what is unspeakably profound. Indeed, in 
this age in which . . . our given human nature no longer commands re-
spect, in which our bodies are regarded as mere instruments of our au-
tonomous rational wills, repugnance may be the only voice left that 
speaks up to defend the central core of our humanity. Shallow are the 
souls that have forgotten how to shudder.65 
 
More specifically, Kass complains of the way that reproductive technologies (clon-
ing, specifically, but I think it fair to read his critique as more general) turn “procreation 
into manufacture,” and that such technologies where the manufacturer “stands above [the 
product] . . . by his will and creative prowess” are “profoundly dehumanizing, no matter 
how good the product.”66 
As I have suggested in other work, this kind of objection in turn has two interpreta-
tions, that I have called “consequentialist” and “intrinsic” corruption.67 
1. Consequentialist Corruption 
Consequentialist Corruption justifies intervention to prevent changes to our atti-
                                                 
  63.   See SANDEL, supra note 2, at 46.  
  64.   In the related context of wrongful life, Seanna Shiffrin has taken a different view that harms in repro-
duction cannot be outweighed by greater “pure” benefits. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procre-
ative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 148 (1999). For my critique of her 
view, see Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 1, at 1244-64. 
  65.   Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, in THE ETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING 19 (1998). 
  66.   Id. at 38, 39. 
  67.   I. Glenn Cohen, Circumvention Tourism, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1309, 1376-81 (2012); Cohen, Regulat-
ing the Organ Market, supra note 22; I. Glenn Cohen, Note, The Price of Everything, The Value of Nothing: 
Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2003) [hereinafter Cohen, The Price of Eve-
rything]. 
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tudes or sensibilities that will occur if the practice is allowed, that in Kass’ version will 
cause us to view our children (and perhaps ourselves even as adults, in which case the 
objection extends beyond choosing our children) as dehumanized products, or in San-
del’s as objects of our mastery and free authorship. While Sandel and others frame this in 
terms of “corruption” of ways of life, it can easily be reframed using the language and 
concepts of economics as negative externalities.68 
This concern is contingent and to be successful must rely on empirical evidence, in 
that it depends on whether attitudes actually change.69 In the case of enhancement, it is 
hard to know what to make of the existing evidence. The opportunity to enhance our 
children through non-biological means (SAT tutoring, camps for the arts, etc.) and bio-
logical non-genetic means (such as Ritalin and anti-depressants) has now been common 
for some time. It is unclear to me how one might go about measuring how much parental 
attitudes have been “distorted” already and/or how more sophisticated genetic enhance-
ments might further “distort” it. The dynamics are complex here. Suppose it became pos-
sible to develop a genetic alteration applied pre-birth that would give children the musi-
cal abilities consistent with a lifetime of piano lessons. Would that gene further “distort” 
parental attitudes (by allowing parents to dictate that their child will be a music prodigy), 
reduce the “distortion” (since now parents will not have to force their children to spend 
hours practicing piano, a form of parental dominance) or would it actually cause them 
not to pursue piano at all (if every child can be a prodigy, perhaps the positional value is 
erased and thus the interest in having one’s child be one is reduced)?  
I have put the term “distortion” in scare quotes because among the difficulties in 
such measurement is achieving a baseline of the ideal parental attitude from which dis-
tortion can be measured. The right level of parental control, from “Tiger Mother” to 
“Free To Be You and Me” has varied over the course of history and between cultures.70 I 
doubt we would reach consensus on what level of parental control versus laissez-faire is 
desirable (what I have elsewhere called a conventionalist account of corruption), nor do I 
think the ideal parent-child relationship can be deduced from introspective moral reason-
ing about the nature of the practice (what I have elsewhere called an “essentialist” ac-
count of corruption).71 
Even if we put these concerns with this objection aside, it is still important to dis-
tinguish the application of enhancement to children before they are conceived or perhaps 
born versus enhancement after birth. In many ways, it is the latter enhancements that 
should concern us more, not only for the reasons discussed above relating to harm to the 
children the problems of Best Interests of the Resulting Child arguments, but even as to 
corruption of third party values. As Kamm has argued, it may be that parental attitudes 
that countenance post birth enhancement are different from those that countenance pre-
                                                 
  68.   See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 
2305, 2325-26 (1995) (framing the potential for corruption of women’s sexuality as part of commercial surro-
gacy as a “soft externalit[y]”).  
  69.   See Scott Altman, (Com)modifying Experience, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 294-97 (1991); Cohen, The 
Price of Everything, supra note 67, at 692 n.13; Cohen, Regulating the Organ Market, supra note 22.  
  70.   AMY CHUA, BATTLE HYMN OF THE TIGER MOTHER (2011); FREE TO BE YOU AND ME (Hen’s Tooth 
Video 1974). 
  71.   For more on the distinctions between essentialist and conventionalist accounts of corruptions and cri-
tiques of both, see Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 67, at 693-703. 
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birth ones in terms of what the appropriate balance of accepting versus transforming love 
of our children should be: 
 
Love, it has been said, is for a particular. Consider love for an adult. 
Before we love someone, we may be interested in meeting a person 
who has various properties, such as kindness, intelligence, artistic abil-
ity, a good sense of humor, etc. When we meet such a person we may 
be  interested  in  him rather than someone else because he has these 
properties. However, though it is through these properties that we may 
be led to love this particular person, it is the particular person that we 
wind up loving, not his set of properties. For if another person appears 
with the same set of properties, that does not mean that we could as 
easily substitute him for the person we already love. Even if the person 
we love loses some of the properties through which we were originally 
led to love him (e.g., his beauty) and another person has more of the 
good properties that originally interested us, we would not necessarily 
stop loving the particular person we love. 
 
It seems then that when we love a particular person, this involves much 
of what Sandel calls accepting love. If we do seek transformation in the 
properties of the person we love, this may be because of moral re-
quirements or because we want what is good for him. By contrast, be-
fore a particular person whom we love exists (just as before we find 
someone to love), it is permissible to think more broadly in terms of the 
characteristics we would like to have in a person and that we think it is 
best for a person to have, at least so long as these characteristics would 
not be bad for the person who will have them and are consistent with 
respect for persons. . . . 
 
Before the existence of a person, there is no person yet with certain 
characteristics that we have to accept if we love him and do not want to 
impose  undue  burdens  necessary  for  changes.  Hence,  not  accepting 
whatever  characteristics  nature  will  bring  but  altering  them  ex  ante 
does not show lack of love. Nor can it insult or psychologically pres-
sure a person the way ex post changes might, as no conscious being yet 
exists.  Importantly,  it  is  (somewhat  paradoxically)  rational  and  ac-
ceptable to seek good characteristics in a new person, even though we 
know that when the child comes to be and we love him or her, many of 
these characteristics may come and go and we will continue to love the 
particular person.72 
 
                                                 
  72.   Kamm, supra note 10, at 10-11 (citing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1977)). See 
Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 67, at 693-703. Kamm also lodges other attacks at Sandel’s views 
that I will not rehearse here but instead direct the interested reader to.  
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To be sure this account of parental love is not without its critics. Fox, for example, 
argues that:  
 
The love that we believe parents ought to have for their children is 
more aptly described as love at first sight. This is a love that properly 
takes hold before parents learn anything about the sort of person the 
child is or will become. It is fitting for parents to embark on love for a 
child in a manner that is not contingent on the particular characteristics 
about her that we value. Love for children is not something that parents 
that can justifiably forsake on grounds that they are no longer fond of 
those particulars. For this love is not, in the first instance, love for the 
particular, but rather love for the person who comes to occupy that spe-
cial role within the parent-child relationship, regardless of whether or 
not the child’s attributes are ones that the parents ever wished for or 
came to find desirable.
73 
 
  I am not sure who has the better of the argument. I think Fox may be right that parents 
would be wrong to stop loving their child if he stopped exhibiting some particulars (e.g., 
a car accident leaves him unable to walk), but perhaps not others (e.g., he pursues a life 
of crime and ends up murdering an innocent, or if you need more tragedy, ends up mur-
dering all his siblings). But putting aside whether loss of particulars (and which) could 
justify when parents can stop loving a child they began to love, I think Kamm is on to 
something in distinguishing the prenatal and postnatal context. There is nothing wrong 
with trying to choose the child you would like to have (and love) in deciding the method 
of creating that child, so long as you agree to love the child you end up having, perhaps 
despite your best efforts. 
 
Finally, even if one is convinced that enhancement (i) is empirically likely to (ii) 
distort us from a morally defensible baseline of what attitudes parents should adopt to 
their children, that does not itself lead to the view that such enhancements of children 
should be prohibited. First, it is possible that the negative consequences could be avoided 
through re-education campaigns, the laying of moral but not legal sanction on parents 
who enhance their children, etc. Second, by conceiving consequentialist corruption as a 
negative externality, we can also imagine the typical intervention suggested by law and 
economics approaches to this kind of externality—finding ways to make parents internal-
ize the negative externality. In theory, this might lead us to impose a tax (perhaps pegged 
to a percentage of one’s parental income to avoid inequality) to use enhancement, and 
take the spoils and redistribute it towards cultural education programs aimed at combat-
ting  corruption  (parenting  courses  emphasizing  the  importance  of  accepting  parental 
love, tax credits for television and film productions that support this theme). Of course, 
in reality, this would be hard to accomplish but it is important to understand that if the 
objection here is to an externalized cost, it is in keeping with many other such costs faced 
                                                 
  73.   Fox, supra note 9, at 257-58. 
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by the law and hardly exceptional. Finally, even if this externality could not be internal-
ized, we have to compare it to whatever benefit is produced by the behavior in question. 
If the enhancements to these children were good enough in terms of generating a reduc-
tion of other negative externalities (again, imagine the enhancement was the ability to 
live consuming much less food and thus taxing the environment much less) whatever 
new  negative  externalities  are  generated  through  changing  parental  mores  may  be 
dwarfed.74 
2. Intrinsic Corruption 
A second conception of corruption, intrinsic corruption is an objection that focuses 
on the “inherent incompatibility between an object and a mode of valuation,” where the 
wrongfulness of the action is completed at the moment of purchase irrespective of what 
follows; the intrinsic version of the objection obtains even if the act remains secret or has 
zero effect on anyone’s attitudes.75 It has a more Kantian flavor to it as compared to its 
consequentialist counterpart. 
Such a view escapes some of the objections to consequentialist corruption I have 
raised: there is no need to show empirically that the corruption in question takes place, 
and the fact that there may be positive benefits to the enhancement may seem irrelevant, 
at least if one takes a strong view that this intrinsic corruption cannot be trumped by 
good consequences from the act. All the other objections I have raised in the prior sec-
tion,  however,  persist.  Further,  for  some  (who  have  more  consequentialist  leanings 
and/or adopt an “experience requirement” as to human welfare)76, the notion that intrin-
sic corruption that affects no one’s experience of the world is something that is deeply 
morally problematic and may not seem persuasive. 
ii. Rights to An Open Future 
Joel Feinberg, among others, argued for a “‘right to an open future,’” and that chil-
dren should be “permitted to reach maturity with as many open options, opportunities, 
and advantages as possible.”77 As Fox puts the problem, “[b]y allowing enhancements 
for non-primary goods, which are beneficial for some life plans at a cost to others” some 
enhancements may “fall[] foul of the option-maximizing requirement of children’s right 
to an open future.”78 
There are two responses to this kind of objection. The first response is internal to 
the objection—it accepts the right to an open future as a kind of right (or at least an im-
portant interest to motivate policy) but then disputes whether most enhancements threat-
                                                 
  74.   At this juncture one might be tempted to think that the negative “corruption” externalities may also be 
dwarfed by the benefit to the children themselves of the enhancement. I think that is a problematic line of 
thinking, though, for reasons I discuss in the next Part. See infra Part IV. 
  75.   Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 67, at 692 n.13; cf. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE  IN 
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 144, 172 (1993). 
  76.   See, e.g., L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 127 (1996) (citation omitted); I. Glenn 
Cohen, The Right Not to be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1139 n.64 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen, 
Genetic Parent]. 
  77.   Joel  Feinberg,  The  Child’s  Right  to  an  Open  Future,  in  WHOSE  CHILD?  CHILDREN’S  RIGHTS, 
PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 126, 130 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980). 
  78.   Fox, The Illiberality of ‘Liberal Eugenics’, supra note 38, at 20. 
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en this right (or interest). Along these lines, Fox writes that: 
 
[L]iberalism does not accord offspring any such right. What is required 
to secure offspring autonomy is not access to the greatest number of 
life plans, but rather, first, the faculty—given by a cluster of personal 
abilities  including  knowledge,  experience,  emotional  independence, 
and critical reasoning—and, second, the facility to choose freely among 
a reasonable range of life plans. 
 
There are at least two reasons why parental values should be accorded 
some role in steering the direction their children’s lives will take. 
 
The first reason relates parental decision-making to the social precondi-
tions of offspring autonomy . . . . Parental decisions which reduce the 
absolute number of life plans available to offspring while at the same 
time  giving  context  and  meaning  to  socially  embedded  projects  and 
pursuits are wholly consistent with liberalism’s commitment to auton-
omy, so long as parental decisions preserve for progeny the opportunity 
for genuine choice among a diversity of viable life plans. 
 
The second reason to reject Feinberg’s option-maximizing principle re-
lates private parental choices to the experience of intimate relationships 
within the institution of family. . . . Far-reaching public incursion into 
childrearing decisions would jeopardise the experience of intimacy by 
displacing the sense that one’s interests within the family are ‘fused 
with those of another’ with the sense that those interests instead serve 
public goals.79 
 
This approach yields a kind of Goldilocks approach to enhancement. It would lop 
off as verboten enhancements that reduce too much the number of open life plans for an 
enhanced child; the goal is not for regulation to keep the maximum number of life plans 
open, but instead to keep sufficient life plans open to avoid a kind of parental despotism. 
It would also, however, leave sufficient room for parental preference to alter their chil-
dren in keeping with the notion that parental preferences are essential for fostering off-
spring autonomy, very much in analogy to what one might say about parental religious 
preferences for the upbringing of the child.80 It would thus cleave off some enhance-
                                                 
  79.   Id. at 20-21 (internal citations omitted). 
  80.   Cf. Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 1, at 1204-08 (discussing analogies between constitutional 
and political theoretical guarantees and limitations of religious rearing of children and state limits on reproduc-
tive choices of parents); see also Fox, supra note 9, at 250: 
The greater specificity with which parents can expect the hoped-for products of their pro-
jects to be achieved, the less open they show themselves to the possible contours along 
which their [children’s] lives may unfold. Some methods of genetic enhancement are 
modest in aspiration . . . . The consummately controlling reproductive act is nuclear so-
matic cell transfer, otherwise known as human cloning . . . . The desire for a child clone 
of a parent, loved one, or the desired genotype of another reflects the expectation that 
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ments (that take away too much from children in terms of their life plan choice) while 
leaving others (that increase the number of open life plans or leave a sufficient number of 
life plans open). Such an approach requires the ethicist (and ultimately the policy maker) 
to specify how much openness is sufficient, and how much enhancement in one or a set 
of a life plans can justify how much of a reduction in the chance of pursuing further life 
plans. 
A second more radical and more external critique I might offer, stemming from my 
own work, is to ask why the number of open life plans matters. For reasons I have of-
fered in prior work, mentioned above, and apply to enhancement again Part IV of this 
article, one might argue that one very good reason for caring about the number of life 
plans that remain open—because leaving more life plans open is better for the children 
that result—may be a problematic justification for some kinds of enhancements (certain-
ly enhancement by selection of gametes, potentially pre-embryonic manipulation). For 
reasons related to the non-identity problem, in these cases it is wrong to think of our-
selves as narrowing or broadening the life plans available to a particular child, thereby 
harming or improving that child’s welfare; instead what we are really doing is replacing 
children with fewer (or insufficient) open life plans with children with more (or suffi-
cient) open life plans. That may be a desirable thing to achieve, but it is not desirable be-
cause it improves the life or prevents harm to this particular child. It does no such thing. 
Instead, such a justification for limiting enhancements must be desirable because it im-
proves parental welfare, reduces social externalities, or is favored from an impersonal 
non-person-affecting viewpoint, principles that I have suggested in prior work face some 
difficulties in justifying legal intervention.81 
iii. Lack of Creativity 
At the end of an essay on enhancement focused on attacking Michael Sandel’s po-
sition, Kamm intriguingly suggests that: 
 
A deeper issue, I think, is our lack of imagination as designers. That is, 
most people’s conception of the varieties of goods is very limited, and 
if they designed people their improvements would likely conform to 
limited, predictable types. But we should know that we are constantly 
surprised at the great range of good traits in people, and even more the 
incredible range of combinations of traits that turn out to produce “fla-
vors” in people that are, to our surprise, good. For example, could we 
predict that a very particular degree of irony combined with a certain 
degree of diffidence would constitute an interesting type of personali-
ty? . . . [T]he “lack of imagination” objection to enhancement I am now 
voicing is based on a concern that in seeking enhancements people will 
focus on too simple and basic a set of goods. 
                                                                                                                       
whatever biological particulars are known about the past life of the cloned individual 
should bear a commanding influence on the course of the life that is to come. 
  81.   See generally Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 1; Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 
1. 
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. . . 
[T]he lack of imagination objection emphasizes that when creatures of 
limited imagination do not design themselves and others, they are likely 
to extend the range of their appreciation of goods because the range of 
goods is likely to be larger. A parent who might have designed his child 
to have the good trait of composing classical music, could not have 
conceived that it would be good to have a child who turns out to be one 
of the Beatles. (To have conceived it, would have involved creating the 
style before the Beatles did.) The lack of imagination objection is con-
cerned that too much control will limit the number and combination of 
goods from what is possible. Hence, at least in those cases where en-
hancement—greater goods—is more likely to come about if chance ra-
ther than unimaginative choice is in control, the desire for enhancement 
will militate against control. 
 
In some ways, Kamm’s suggestion is simpatico with the externalities concern with 
enhancement. We could reframe it as a concern that as against the existing baseline of 
random distribution of traits and abilities and the externalized benefits and costs they 
represent, the net externalized benefits and costs will be greater where enhancement is 
permitted because individuals will make unimaginative choices. Or, to put it a bit glibly, 
“mother nature knows best” and people will make bad choices when they enhance. This 
is an empirical question. I must admit, understood as such, I am skeptical about the ob-
jection.  The  current  (relatively  random)  baseline  distribution  of  attributes  includes  a 
large amount of externalized costs, and it seems to me that it is just as likely (indeed 
more likely) that in a future of unimaginative but planned enhancements there were 
would be fewer externalized costs and more externalized benefits; the one thing that un-
imaginative people are good at imagining, after all, is costs! The bigger threat is that un-
imaginative positional enhancements have externalized (and transferred) costs. But noth-
ing  new  is  added  in  this  reformulation  by  the  fact  that  the  enhancements  are 
unimaginative or homogenous. The response is the same discussed above and in greater 
depth by Elhauge as to absolute versus positional benefits and transferred costs, and the 
potential regulations aimed at curbing this concern such as Pigouvian taxes. Indeed, it 
may be that lack of imagination helps the concern about externalized costs from posi-
tional goods: the more homogenously chosen an enhancement is, the more people will 
have it, and the less useful it will be as a position enhancement.82 
But perhaps the reframing of the objection in the language of law and economics 
loses something? Perhaps Kamm’s objection is not about tangible costs to others but the 
loss of something ineffable in a society of far-too-similars? Of course, no matter how 
good enhancement technologies become—genetic or otherwise—only so much homoge-
nization will be possible, and there will still be significant room for luck both in how ef-
fective particular enhancements are and in the thousands of experiences a day that shape 
                                                 
  82.   I say “may” because it may depend a little on just how many people seek an enhancement. That is, there 
is a tipping point where if too many people select for the same homogenous enhancement, we get the “coercion 
of voluntary enhancements” through competition effect discussed above. 
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us. It is so hard for me to imagine a world of genetic homogeneity (for example, if eve-
ryone were identical twins?) that I have a hard time figuring out whether we currently 
have too much, not enough, or just the right amount of heterogeneity in our traits and 
abilities. 
All that said, if this lack of imagination really was a concern, I have a fanciful but 
effective intervention I call the “gumball solution.” Picture an old-school gumball ma-
chine. You deposit your nickel (or perhaps now quarter, or dollar?) and turn the knob. It 
is fairly unpredictable just what specific gumball colors you get and turning the knob at a 
different time or in a different sequence of users would likely lead to a different set of 
candy. We could build a gumball machine dynamic into every enhancement. We could 
allow you to choose, say 80 percent (or 99 percent) of your enhancements off a menu, 
but for the last 20 percent we would randomize what you received. That would ensure 
some heterogeneity and unusual combinations without requiring us to ban enhancements 
altogether or regulate them more heavily. 
* * * 
This survey of possible objections to enhancement is not meant to be exhaustive, 
but I do think it captures the major concerns. My goal has not been to evaluate thorough-
ly any particular objection, but to offer some general pushback to all objections to try to 
sort wheat from chaff. 
My tentative conclusion is that some of these objections—reductions in compas-
sion or solidarity, the distribution of honorifics and the importance of randomness, the 
disfiguring the parent-child relationship/corruption—are often overstated and do not rep-
resent serious concerns with enhancements, once these objections are properly under-
stood. 
A second set of objections—that enhancements will worsen inequality due to une-
qual access, that enhancements will foist upon us negative externalities—seem to be se-
rious moral concerns, but ones for which regulation of enhancement could make signifi-
cant headway: subsidization of enhancements could help reduce inequality that results 
from their availability, and indeed might enable reductions in existing levels of inequali-
ty in the moral luck of the distribution of abilities and traits in the pre-enhancement base-
line; Pigouvian tax systems can help make those who opt for enhancement internalize the 
externalities, especially for positional goods. For these objections, such softer regulatory 
interventions seem to me far preferable to adopting strategies aimed at prohibition. 
There is a third grouping of objections—safety concerns with enhancements per-
taining to those who are enhanced, the coercion of voluntary enhancement—that strike 
me as both more serious moral concerns but also more difficult to fully correct through 
softer forms of intervention. For this category, I think the taxonomy of enhancement 
types set out in Part I will enable us to determine for which sub-categories more prohibi-
tory strategies are or are not appropriate.  
For safety concerns, the enhancements that are more likely to involve great risk to 
the person seeking to enhance are genetic enhancements and/or irreversible ones.83 Even 
                                                 
  83.   Once again, as I argued above, if the concern is about harm to the enhanced, that concern is logically 
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for these enhancements it may be that prohibition is inappropriate, and choice architec-
ture interventions (such as waiting periods, strong default rules in the other direction, 
etc.) and taxation are more appropriate—one’s reactions may largely depend on one’s 
feelings about the scope of justified paternalism (for self-enhancement) and of parens 
patriae  state  interventions  into  child  rearing  (for  enhancing  children).  In  any  event, 
should we choose to opt for the more prohibitory strategy, we have a ready model in 
FDA’s premarket approval regime for drugs, which requires showing both safety and ef-
ficacy as a prerequisite for selling the drug. 
For fears of the coercion of voluntary enhancement, the objection is at its zenith 
where adopting such enhancements is costly or risky (in safety terms) for the person who 
chooses to enhance only to “keep up.” As my pilot example from earlier suggests, before 
giving this objection substantial force we will want to interrogate whether we think the 
pressure to enhance in this domain is, on balance, a bad thing, or whether the gains justi-
fy the enhancement. Where the enhancement offers gains in absolute and not positional 
goods, and where the enhancement has stronger positive net externalities, the argument 
for regulating is weaker. 
I think several of the objections that are specific to enhancing children, such as 
claims of a right to an open future, face difficulties related to the Non-Identity Problem. 
While pitched as concerns for the welfare of the children who will have these limited 
lives, at least where enhancement is achieved through selection of gametes (and poten-
tially more broadly, see below) the argument cannot succeed as such because it confuses 
improving a child’s welfare or preventing harm to it with replacing the child with anoth-
er higher welfare child. 
The last category, involving fears of the effects of homogeneity through enhance-
ment and lack of imagination—strikes me as one whose force is difficult to evaluate. If 
this is just a redux of the externalities concern, then it seems to me appropriate to evalu-
ate it in terms similar to that concern, and little is added. By contrast, if there is some-
thing less tangible to which the objection gestures, the objection poses two hard to an-
swer questions: the normative question of what is the optimum level of homogeneity vs. 
heterogeneity in abilities and traits and how to measure divergences from that optimum 
in terms of positive and negative externalities from enhancement; the empirical question 
of how much permitting enhancement will steer us towards or away from that optimum 
level, whatever it becomes defined as. Finally, even as to this objection a solution is pos-
sible. My “gumball solution” is meant to offer a fanciful way of introducing some ran-
domness back in the system, and there may be far more pragmatic (if less fun) ways of 
implementing that goal, should we be in a situation where homogeneity worries us. 
Now that we have a clear idea of what may be wrong with enhancements, as to 
which type of enhancements, and what role the law has in combatting these concerns, we 
are ready to shift to the opposite side of the ledger. 
IV. WHAT (IF ANYTHING) IS RIGHT ABOUT ENHANCEMENT? 
Much less attention has been paid in the literature to the reasons why individuals 
                                                                                                                       
problematic for cases of enhancement achieved through selection, so long as the child has a life worth living, 
for the same reasons that I have argued against Best Interests of the Resulting Child arguments more generally. 
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choose enhancement, except for the argument by Sandel, Kass, and the like that these 
motivations—what they call desire to mastery, turning procreation to manufacture, etc.—
are themselves something problematic about enhancements. What I want to ask is a more 
basic question: does the motivation one might offer for choosing to enhance make sense? 
What are the possible motivations? One is a desire to achieve positional gains and 
win the “game of life” or at least a small slice of it. In a regime where everyone will en-
hance because the enhancements are safe, costless (or subsidized), etc., that desire may 
be counter-productive and we are better off with an equilibrium where no one can en-
hance as one where everyone can enhance, except insofar as the existing distribution of 
talents through the current “random” processes generates more negative externalities. I 
put “random” in scare quotes because the current process by which genes get transmitted 
is not really random. Assortative mating, in which individuals with similar genotypes 
and/or phenotypes mate with one another more frequently than a random mating pattern, 
leads to particular advantages and disadvantages for their offspring in genetic and envi-
ronmental terms; American marriage patterns already deeply reflect this tendency with 
matching on socioeconomic and education levels becoming increasingly common.84 In-
deed, a Princeton alumna became famous (or infamous) in 2013 for a letter to The Daily 
Princetonian in urging Princeton women to find a husband during their years at Prince-
ton since they would never again have access to as good a “stable” (my term, not hers) of 
men and would be unhappy if they ended their life with career success but not a suitable 
husband.85 
Thus, especially in terms of enhancing our children, it is important to emphasize 
that we are already deep into a system of enhancement through our marital and non-
marital reproductive mate choices. Now, of course, unlike a true enhancement regime, 
for most of us our assortative mating is not unencumbered by other interests. There is 
attraction, sex, family life, and of course romance also directing us in our mate selection 
in ways that might be less-than-optimal from an enhancement perspective (and of course 
most of the “special sauce” in love is in the less-than-optimal!). For single individuals, 
same-sex couples, and those with certain forms of infertility or certain genetic diseases, 
in selecting a sperm or egg “donor” they by necessity are able to make choices that un-
bundle what would be best from an enhancement perspective from what would be best 
from a romantic partner perspective. Of course, all of us theoretically could divorce our 
choices about life partners from our choices about reproduction. If we were willing to 
give up genetic relatedness, one could just barely imagine a future where everyone re-
produced via selecting the sperm and egg of others from catalogues. Many would be hor-
rified by such a future, but for now my goal is not to pass judgment but instead to em-
phasize that given our existing preference structure that attaches some utility to genetic 
                                                 
  84.   See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Is Marriage for Rich People? A Book Review of Ralph Richard Banks's Is Mar-
riage for White People?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1325, 1334-36 (discussing decline of marriage between individuals 
of different socioeconomic levels); Linda C. McClain, The Other Marriage Equality Problem, 93 B.U. L. REV. 
921, 944 (2013) (discussing data showing tendency towards “assortative marriage”). 
  85.   See Susan A. Patton, Letter to the Editor, Advice for the Young Women of Princeton: The Daughters I 
Never Had, DAILY PRINCETONIAN (Mar. 29, 2013), available at   
http://thedailyprincetonian.wordpress.com/2013/03/29/opinion-letter-to-the-editor-march-29-2013/;  see  also 
Ross Douthat, The Secrets of Princeton, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2013, at SR11. 
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relatedness, there would be costs (in terms of losing that utility and the cost of using the 
technology) that offset the value of enhancements. Given the well-known divergence be-
tween genotype and phenotype, and the fact the latter is what most parents care about 
when imagining their future children, it may be that in most cases the advantages to hav-
ing enhanced children through gamete selection may be smaller than those costs.86 
So if enhancement by selection of gamete providers is the main way to enhance 
our children genetically these days, for many potential parents the costs may outweigh 
the benefits. Ironically, the exception is those who cannot reproduce in the “old fash-
ioned” way, that is both the infertile and what I have elsewhere referred to as the “dysfer-
tile”—gays, lesbians, and single individuals who are unable to naturally reproduce for 
non-medical reasons.87 For them enhancement may make the most sense, since they are 
already giving up genetic relatedness and bearing some of the costs of assisted reproduc-
tion. 
A different motivation that is sometimes given for enhancement of our children, 
though, is that it would be good for our children. This is certainly the justification parents 
use when imposing non-biological enhancement on children before they are old enough 
to choose—Piano lessons at an early age to enhance musical ability or sports coaching to 
enhance their ability to play—and even imposing on children once they are old enough 
to resist—tutoring in math or for the SAT. Can it also serve as the justification for pre-
conception or pre-birth enhancements h? That is, a reason given by parents for wanting 
to have children with enhancements is because it will improve the life of those children, 
they are doing it for themselves. The major contribution I want to make in this Part is to 
explain why for at least pre-birth enhancements by selection, that reasoning is logically 
problematic. 
The reason is, as I have argued elsewhere, there is a problem in moving from ar-
guments about best interests of existing children (i.e., what would make existing children 
better off) to argument about best interests of resulting children (i.e., what would make 
children better off by changing which children come into existence through reproduc-
tion). That is: 
 
Whenever  the  proposed  intervention  will  itself  determine  whether  a 
                                                 
  86.   Note though that, to some extent, this is a function of existing technology of enhancement. If post-
conception (or even post-birth) genetic manipulation became possible, safe, and readily available, one might 
have one’s cake and eat it too by conceiving with a romantic partner and then manipulating one’s offspring to 
achieve enhancement. In such a potential future world, there would be interesting questions about what the 
concept of “genetic relatedness” means. In particular, like the mythical Ship of Thebes, if we replace or alter 
‘plank’ after ‘plank’ of an offspring’s genotype, at what point does one say the resulting child is not genetically 
related to its parent? Or is the important relationship for our concept of genetic relation the fact that “original” 
material came from the parents’ sperm and egg. Cf. Cohen, Genetic Parent, supra note 76, at 1137 n.63 (dis-
cussing the strange case of Tim Twomey, who suffered from anorchia—a rare disorder where he was born with 
a penis but without testicles—and opted to receive a transplant testicle from his identical twin, Terry, which 
allowed Tim to produce a son with his wife, instead of having his wife inseminated with his twin’s sperm, and 
asking whether Tim’s preference for the transplant (which made no difference genetically speaking) captures 
something about the way we think about reproduction). 
  87.   Dov  Fox  &  I.  Glenn  Cohen,  It  is  Time  for  the  U.S.  to  Cover  IVF  (for  Gays  and  Lesbians  too), 
HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 18, 2013, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dov-fox/it-is-time-for-the-us-
to-_b_2900323.html.  
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particular child will come into existence, best interest arguments prem-
ised on that child’s welfare are problematic. 
 
      This point is at the core of the “Non-Identity Problem” developed by 
Derek Parfit, a problem that has been the subject of a great deal of phil-
osophical attention since the publication of Parfit’s Reasons and Per-
sons in 1984. The punchline of the problem is that we cannot be said to 
harm children by creating them as long as we do not give them a life 
not worth living. A life not worth living is a life so full of pain and suf-
fering, and so devoid of anything good, that the individual would prefer 
never to have come into existence. As I have demonstrated in Regulat-
ing Reproduction, this insight renders problematic any attempt to use 
BIRC  reasons  to  justify  a  regulation  of  reproduction  that  will  alter 
when, whether, or with whom individuals reproduce—such a regulation 
cannot be said to be in the best interests of the resulting child because a 
different child will result. 
 
The easiest version of the problem to see involves regulation of wheth-
er individuals reproduce, for example, the denials of access to repro-
ductive technology to gay, aged, or single parents. Imagine that sixty 
year old Ethel wants to have a baby through reproductive technology 
and assume arguendo that this child, Maxwell, will be worse off (phys-
iologically, psycho- logically, etc.) than would the average child born 
to a woman in her twenties. We cannot say that a state law preventing 
Ethel’s access to reproductive technology at her age furthers the wel-
fare of Maxwell, because if the State blocks that access Maxwell will 
never exist and, so long as he has a life worth living, coming into exist-
ence  does  not  harm  him.  Thus,  any  state  intervention  influencing 
whether individuals reproduce (absent lives not worth living) cannot be 
justified by BIRC reasoning. 
 
A  similar  problem  extends  to  attempts  to  influence  when  and  with 
whom individuals reproduce. Parfit’s primary discussion of this prob-
lem in Reasons and Persons is that of a four- teen-year-old girl who has 
a child and gives it a bad start in life by not waiting to have a child until 
she is older. As he notes, “We cannot claim that this girl’s decision was 
worse for her child. What is the objection to her decision? This ques-
tion aris- es because, in the different outcomes, different people would 
be born.” Thus, here too the usual (what Parfit calls person- affecting) 
conception of harm assumed by the BIRC argument cannot be the basis 
for justifying attempts to alter  when  individuals  reproduce—such as 
state funding of teenage abstinence programs or implanting of Norplant 
or other temporary forms of birth control in women convicted of multi-
ple counts of drug possession. A similar logic applies to interventions 
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regulating with whom individuals reproduce, for example, the criminal-
ization of adult brother-sister (or first cousin-first cousin) incest in the 
United States and many foreign countries. 
 
At this juncture it is worth clarifying that none of this depends on any 
assumption that children are harmed if they are not brought into exist-
ence. Instead, I share with others the view that “no one is harmed in not 
being created, because there is no one to be harmed if we do not create 
someone.” Thus, accepting this insight in no way implies a conclusion 
that parents do wrong by failing to have the largest number of children 
they can or that they harm a particular child by failing to create the 
child. All it entails is that no one is harmed by being created if he or she 
is given a life worth living. I emphasize this point, because it is com-
mon source of confusion. 
 
In one respect, the whether case is an easier one for ruling out BIRC 
justifications than the with whom case, and especially the when case, 
because in these latter cases the claim de- pends on the assumption that 
changing which sperm meets which egg—that is changing which child, 
genetically  speaking,  is  conceived—is  sufficient  to  produce  a  Non-
Identity Problem that rules out BIRC justifications. This is a relatively 
weak as- sumption. It does not require subscription to a strong form of 
genetic essentialism . . . [i]t is the weak claim that if we want to know 
whether the person that results from the particular sperm and egg com-
bination would be harmed, we cannot say that it would further the wel-
fare of that person if we instead substituted a different sperm and egg 
combination. 
 
To put it tangibly: my mother was married once, without children, be-
fore  she  had  me  with  her  second  husband.  Imagine  we  concluded 
(counterfactually I hope!) that on the day of my conception she had in-
stead conceived with her first husband; the resulting child—call him 
Gabriel—would have been health- ier or in other ways had a better life 
than I did. All the Non- Identity Problem requires accepting is that if 
we want to know whether my life harms me (i.e., is Glenn harmed by 
being alive) it would be wrong to compare Glenn’s life to the life Ga-
briel would have lived. That comparison might be relevant for some 
other purposes—indeed the non-person-affecting principle ap- proach I 
discuss in Part III focuses on it—but is not relevant to the question of 
whether Glenn has been harmed by being born. I believe Parfit is right 
on this issue of alterations of when or with whom we reproduce, and in 
what follows I will examine the consequences for the law.88 
                                                 
  88.   ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 224-25, 233 (2000); 
JOEL FEINBERG, HARM  TO OTHERS 98-104 (1984); Dan W. Brock, The Nonidentity Problem and Genetic 
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My prior work was focused on reproductive decisions by parents that may have the 
effect of “harming” (though I think that term is logically problematic) the resulting chil-
dren. Here I want to emphasize that the point holds in the opposite configuration as well. 
Attempting to enhance one’s children by altering when or with whom one reproduces 
(e.g., delaying reproduction to a period of time when one has more resources, choosing 
gamete donors with desirable traits) cannot be said to improve the lives of one’s children, 
because it instead substitutes other children for the children you would have had. Your 
own children are not made better off if other children replace them in terms of who 
comes into existence. 
Otherwise put, “enhancing one’s child” through selection or timing of reproduction 
is a misnomer and a logical fallacy. It does not enhance one’s children, but instead re-
places them with a different child whose welfare is higher. It is not enhancement but re-
placement. To be sure, the would-have-been child is not harmed by being “replaced”—
no one is harmed by not being brought into existence—but it is also certainly not benefit-
ted. 
Thus,  arguments  for  enhancement  based  on  improving  the  welfare  of  resulting 
children will not work. Instead they are confused stand-ins for quite different kinds of 
reasoning. One substitute set of reasons might be about cost to third parties, reproductive 
externalities.89 Enhancement, as I suggested above, may reduce the costs to the parents 
themselves,  other  family  members,  or  third  parties  in  society  including  governments 
(who may pay directly or otherwise for education, health care, etc.). This may provide a 
good reason to enhance or to even encourage enhancements through subsidization or 
even mandating them, but as I have discussed elsewhere, these arguments about repro-
ductive externalities also present some complicated problems.90 It may also be desirable 
from a set of arguments that are called non-person-affecting principles: 
 
One such view suggests the world would be better off, if instead of per-
son A, who will experience serious suffering or limited opportunity, 
person B, who will not experience those things, came into existence—
that  is,  “[a]lthough  the  person  born  with  the  condition  in  question 
would not have been harmed by birth, the world is better off if a person 
without that harm had been substituted in his place.” We can also un-
derstand this argument to replace the best interests of resulting children 
with the best interests of a resulting population, or as an obligation to 
produce the population of children with the highest welfare possible. It 
is a claim that the world is better off even though no person is made 
                                                                                                                       
Harms—The Case of Wrongful Handicaps, 9 BIOETHICS 269 (1995); Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 
1, at 1208-11 (citing DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 358-59 (1987)); Cohen, Regulating Reproduc-
tion, supra note 1, at 457, 481-513; F.M. Kamm, Cloning and Harm to Offspring, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 65, 72 (2001); Harold Noonan, Identity, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta et al., eds. 2009), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/identity/; David Shoemaker, Personal Identity 
and  Ethics,  STAN.  ENCYCLOPEDIA  PHIL.  (Edward  N.  Zalta  et.  al.,  2008),  available  at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/. 
  89.   See Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, supra note 1, at 1216-40. 
  90.   See id.  
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better off; the world is better in an impersonal sense.91 
 
Elsewhere I have critiqued this justification for reproductive regulation, including 
suggesting it may be hard to morally distinguish from the eugenics movement that is so 
reviled today.92 For present purposes, I just want to emphasize that if parents understood 
that this was the reason why they were actually enhancing their children through selec-
tion, it may be that many would not find it so desirable a thing to do. The desire to help 
our child, to improve his or her welfare, is intuitive and compelling; the desire to replace 
one possible child with another with higher welfare for the sake of making the world im-
personally better is far less so. 
If what I have said is correct, attempts to enhance through changing with whom or 
when we reproduce cannot be justified by an attempt to improve the lives of our chil-
dren, instead it has to be justified by something like the desire to have better children. In 
my prior work I have suggested that realizing this problematizes state justifications that 
restrict reproductive choices. The implication for parental decision-making is a little less 
clear. Even if, at a metaphysical level, I think parents are making an error in their reason-
ing about why they might want to enhance their children, is that an error we should leave 
well enough alone or one that we should try to correct? Certainly if this incorrect reason-
ing were to lead to negative consequences, such as parents choosing to have children 
with high amounts of externalized costs for others under the false belief that this is better 
for those children, I think there would be a strong argument for attempts to re-educate 
these parents. Where the incorrect belief does not have negative consequences for others, 
whether the state should expend resources to try and teach people their own reproductive 
reasoning may be faulty seems more of an open question. I tend to lean towards the idea 
that education on this point (again assuming I am right about it) is desirable, because I 
think reproduction is important enough a part of the human existence that we should try 
to be truth-seekers about it. Moreover, this same faulty reasoning perniciously underlies 
a large number of reproductive restrictions (on single, older, lesbian and gay individuals 
and others) that have I discussed elsewhere.  
What about genetic manipulation of already-conceived but-not-yet born children? 
In other work I have examined the opposite configuration, purposefully trying to have 
children with disabilities, or what I call “intentional diminishment”—for example, deaf 
parents who seek to have a child who is also deaf. In earlier work I examined whether 
the same non-identity problem would apply to a pre-birth genetic alteration that could be 
done to a fertilized pre-embryo that would induce deafness.93 For genetic manipulation 
that enhances rather than diminishes, though, the analysis is the same: if the genetic ma-
nipulation is identity-preserving, then there is no non-identity problem and the genetic 
manipulation can be said to improve the life of the child. If, by contrast, the manipulation 
is identity-changing, then the non-identity problem applies and rather than improve the 
                                                 
  91.   Cohen, Rethinking Sperm Donor Anonymity, supra note 1, at 441 (quoting John A. Robertson, Procrea-
tive Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 16 (2004). See also 
PARFIT, supra note 88, at 359-61, 364-65; Brock, supra note 88, at 273 for discussion of the non-affecting-
person principle.  
  92.   Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 1, at 481-513. 
  93.   See generally Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, supra note 1. 
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life of a resulting child you have replaced it with a different child. 
Which manipulations are which? As I have written in my prior work: 
 
It seems plausible to me that genetic manipulations are quite heteroge-
neous and the line between identity preserving and identity changing 
interventions is unlikely to map onto the line between genetic manipu-
lations and other sorts of interventions. That is, it seems plausible that 
not all genetic manipulations will change personal identity—imagine a 
small manipulation that adds a Marilyn Monroe beauty mark above the 
lip where none would otherwise have been—but other manipulations 
do seem to change the identity of the entity— imagine we replace 75% 
of your DNA with Donkey DNA to create a human-Donkey hybrid. In 
between is a vast spectrum of manipulations that produce very hard 
questions as to the continuity of identity. Even if there were continuity 
of identity between a deaf-born version of yourself and one that was 
not deaf-born. . . what if we added blindness to the mix? Now add men-
tal  retardation?  If  we  also  flipped  your  X-chromosome  for  a  Y-
chromosome and changed your gender (a nondisabling form of genetic 
manipulation)? And so on. To produce an argument along these lines 
one would have to specify, within the class of genetic manipulations, 
which kinds of genetic manipulations are identity preserving and why, 
an extremely difficult task. . . 
 
Of course, I can simply assert that a particular genetic manipulation 
was identity changing, but it is not clear to me how we would know if I 
was “right.” Claims about who we might have been had we been differ-
ent people may give rise to intuitions, but whatever one’s attitude to-
wards the role of intuitions in moral reasoning generally, the basis for 
these specific intuitions seem particularly suspect. It is not clear to me 
from what experiential data I could possibly know if I would have been 
the same person deaf and not deaf, and I worry that these arguments are 
unproveable and unfalsefiable. For these reasons, from a legal perspec-
tive the game may not be worth the candle.94 
 
The same is true for enhancements that manipulate genes. There are some gene 
manipulations that would no doubt be so radical as a form of enhancement to disrupt 
identity in the relevant sense, such that we cannot say the child was “improved” but in-
stead the child was “replaced” as surely as if we switched the gametes that gave rise to 
the child to begin with. Where to draw that line, though, I think is both unknown and po-
tentially unknowable. I simply do not know of a good source of experience or logic by 
which such a line can be devised. 
Moving along the developmental line, what about fetuses? Would genetic or non-
                                                 
  94.   Id. at 358-59. 
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genetic alterations to a fetus in order to “enhance” it improve the welfare of that child or 
replace it with a different child? Answering that question depends on sorting out two 
complex claims. First, what is the relevant kind of identity that matters for enhancement, 
narrative or numerical identity and non-identity? Second, what are the relevant criteria 
for the continuation of identity versus its disruption in the relevant sense of identity? 
These are extremely complex questions—Derek Parfit’s work, in particular, has been 
seminal on the topic.95 While I have touched on this issue elsewhere in my work, I have 
not taken a definitive position, and for the purposes of this paper will merely sketch 
broadly two set of different views for identity-continuation (or if you prefer “preserva-
tion” rather than “disruption”).96 One view associated with John Locke, suggests that 
psychological continuity in the form of memory is what is required for identity preserva-
tion.97 Another view, associated with Jeff McMahan, suggests “that an individual’s ex-
istence as a moral person begins in the womb, during the last two or three months of a 
normal pregnancy, when neural activity, which is associated with rudimentary subjective 
experience, first occurs in a fetus’s brain,” and that only from that point is there identity 
continuity.98 If one thought that these competing views describe the kind of identity rele-
vant to the question of whether you have been harmed or benefited by an intervention, 
then which of the two views (or others) you adopted would have implications as to 
whether the fetus that is enhanced through significant genetic or non-genetic enhance-
ment is the same entity or a different entity from the child that ultimately results, and 
thus  whether  enhancement  has improved  the  welfare  of  that  child  or replaced it. Of 
course, as I said above, there are theories (such as non-person-affecting principle and re-
productive externalities approaches) where replacement of a child with a higher-welfare 
child is desirable. But it is important to accept that that would have to be the goal of such 
an enhancement, and not “making the life of my particular child” better. Once again, im-
provement versus replacement strikes me as a significant distinction both in terms of the 
moral analysis and what most parents take as their motivation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Einer Elhauge, and his unpublished work on the subject, was what propelled me 
down this rabbit hole, and for that I am deeply thankful. This has been more of an explo-
ration of the topic of enhancement than a straight out argumentative enterprise, but none-
theless I think this paper establishes the following points: 
 
•  While bioethicists and lawyers talk about “enhancement” with some fre-
quency, the borders of the concept are not well defined. Moreover, en-
                                                 
  95.   See generally PARFIT, supra note 88. 
  96.   Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, supra note 1, at 356-57. 
  97.   See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 335 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1975):  
[A]s far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, 
so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the same self now  it was then; and ‘tis by 
the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.  
See also Mary Ford, The Personhood Paradox and the ‘Right to Die,’ 13 MED. L. REV. 80, 87-90 (2005). 
  98.   Rakowski, supra note 13, at 1383 n.65 (citing Jeff McMahan, Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality 
of Causing People to Exist, in RATIONAL COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS FOR GREGORY KAVKA 
208, 210-11 (Jules L. Coleman & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1998)). 
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hancements are not at all homogenous, so it would be very foolish to try 
to take a singular position on “enhancement.” 
 
•  One can try to slice-and-dice the concept of enhancement in a myriad of 
ways; Part II of the paper does exactly this, summarizing some divisions 
made in the literature and adding some novel ones. Some of these divi-
sions seem quite useful to me (e.g., pre vs. post birth enhancement, re-
versible vs. irreversible) others seem to me not to carry the normative or 
regulatory weight that some would like to put on them (e.g., biological vs. 
non-biological, treatment vs. enhancement). For even the ones that are 
useful, though, we must always ask useful for what? Whether a distinction 
has moral or regulatory significance depends entirely to me on the par-
ticular moral or legal question being asked. 
 
•  Legal responses to enhancement are often characterized in fairly blunt 
fashion of permit/forbid. In fact, however, we have many more options 
pertaining to subsidization, mandating, choice architecture, deprivation of 
honorifics, etc. Recognizing this panoply of tools also helps us to see that 
some of the objections raised to enhancement are more easily dealt with 
through the law than others. 
 
•  Though often blended together in policy discourse, there are at least ten 
different kinds of objections to enhancement (perhaps more depending on 
how many distinctions one adopts): safety concerns and risks to the en-
hanced, worsening inequality, coercion due to competition, the value of 
randomness in distributing honorifics, reduction in compassion and soli-
darity, externalized costs, disfiguring parent-child relationships, impeding 
children’s rights to an open future, lack of creativity as enhancers, and 
fears of  homogeneity. Some of these are more persuasive than others, 
some depend on particular moral or political theory priors while others do 
not (or depend on different ones), some are more easily dealt with by the 
law  than  others,  and  some  pertain  to  only  particular  categories  of  en-
hancement. I think these distinctions show why one cannot adopt a single 
policy “on enhancement.” Instead, decision-making has to be done at the 
level  of  particular  enhancements  or,  in  some  cases,  categories  of  en-
hancements. 
 
•  Very little has been written on the opposite question—why we want en-
hancement and whether it makes sense. Focusing in particular on parental 
choices to enhance one’s children, I have tried to offer a couple of in-
sights. First, assortative mating is rampant in our society such that en-
hancements of the kind bioethics and the law talk about is really a special 
case of a more general (relatively well-accepted) phenomenon in terms of 
choices made in family formation and partner choice. It is instructive to 
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understand in what ways enhancement is or is not special as compared to 
this case. Second, much of the parental motivation for enhancement lies in 
securing more positional goods for their children, which in turn depends 
on lack of access by some parents lest we all end up living in Lake Wobe-
gone. Finally, while many parents may tell themselves that an enhance-
ment is aimed at making their child better off, in the case of enhancement 
by gamete selection and perhaps some other pre-birth enhancements, the-
se parents are not making their child better off but replacing him with an-
other “better” child. Can that be justified? Perhaps, but justifications for 
replacement are more controversial and complicated than relying on the 
shibboleth that everyone would want to help their child be better. 
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